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Introduction 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
transformed the security environment of the 1990s and the following decade radically. 
The proliferation of multilateral institutions and non-state actors had a major impact on 
decision-making and policy implementation in security policy. New actors like 
regional associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private 
security/military companies gained growing influence, partly thanks to the increasing 
popularity of neoliberal ideas since the 1980s. Currently, governments increasingly 
rely on the services of non-state actors, especially in the implementation phase, and 
security policy is not exempt from this trend.  On the other hand, NGOs and private 
firms undoubtedly have more opportunities to affect decisions concerning public 
policies.  
While going through the literature on the influence of non-state actors in contemporary 
security policy, I found that the research on non-state actors‟ influence is dominated by 
studies focusing on the “bad guys” (e.g. private military and security companies) and 
on how they alter the traditional notion of state sovereignty by challenging the 
monopoly to use force. Considerably less attention is given to the role that NGOs and 
private companies play in decision-making and policy implementation in security 
policy, albeit the implications of such a mechanism are just as important as those of 
the use of private companies in military operations.  
Therefore, I decided to study the impact of NGOs in security policy, centring my 
thesis on the analysis of the “Norwegian model” and the factors that contribute to the 
efficiency of this unique cooperation between state and civil society. My thesis intends 
to give a detailed picture of the personal experiences, dilemmas and views of the 
actors concerning the cooperation, both from the NGO and the governmental side. 
Furthermore, in the conclusion I would like to evaluate the applicability and usefulness 
of the model in other settings. In the last decade, the active participation of civil 
society has been seen as the ultimate cure for the democratic deficit and the legitimacy 
 7 
 
crisis in the EU, and thus the findings about a well-functioning governance 
arrangement could be of paramount importance for the international organisation.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Elke Krahmann describes the new phenomenon of the post-Cold War era with the term 
„security governance”, reflecting on the process of constant negotiation and 
cooperation between different political, financial and social actors both from the public 
and the private sphere (Krahmann 2003a). Whereas the traditional notion of 
“government” is characterised by “a system of centralized political control within a 
state”, “governance” refers to the “fragmented mode of policy making that includes 
state and non-state actors at the subnational, national, and international level” 
(Krahmann 2005a:11). The gradual change from government to governance is also a 
necessity, given that the most significant security threats of today originate from non-
state actors and do not respect national borders or jurisdictions. In order to be able to 
combat the new global and transnational threats, an altered security policy mechanism 
is required, with the inclusion of new actors in the process of decision-making and 
implementation (ibid.).  
However, similarly to other policy areas, security governance also leads to the 
fragmentation of authority, accountability and responsibility, and it is not yet decided 
whether the result will be a more democratic way of policy making or rather 
democratic deficit (Krahmann 2005b).  
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The Norwegian Model 
 
According to the Norwegian diplomat Jan Egeland who coined the term in the late 
1980s, "the purest form of the Norwegian model is the foreign ministry working in 
symbiosis with one or more academic or nongovernmental humanitarian 
organizations" (Ford 2000). More generally, the Norwegian model can be described as 
the special form of cooperation between the state authorities on the one side, and 
academic and humanitarian organisations on the other side (Tvedt 2003:56).  
Tvedt (2003:55) sees the Norwegian model as Norway‟s contribution to world politics 
in the era of globalisation, which is both an efficient tool for pursuing altruistic goals 
and an internationally promoted Norwegian trademark since the 1990s and especially 
since the success of the Oslo Process (ibid:56). While the first big success that was 
based on a strong state-NGO cooperation was the Guatemala peace process ending 
with a peace agreement in 1996, the success of the Oslo Channel resulting in a peace 
agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis in 1993 established Norway‟s role 
as a peace negotiator and humanitarian superpower (NORAD 2008:66).  
However, the success of the Norwegian model was facilitated by several factors that 
are characteristic of Norway. First of all, there is a wide consensus about the goals and 
means of Norwegian foreign policy among political parties, with a similarly wide 
public acceptance (Dobinson and Dale 2000:49). Ever since the success of the peace 
processes in the 1990s, peace negotiations and an active development policy have been 
seen as the defining factors of Norwegian identity, and being a “humanitarian 
superpower” as the key to international forums where important decisions are taken 
(Tvedt 2003:67). As then deputy foreign minister Raymond Johansen put it in 2000: 
“When [Norwegian Foreign Minister] Thorbjørn Jagland rings up Madeline Albright, 
she doesn't know if he's calling because he wants her help in some cod fishing dispute 
with Iceland, or because he's just resolved one of the world's wars, and he wants her to 
help arrange a signature ceremony in Washington” (Ford 2000). Thus, Norway 
accumulates “soft power” through its international role in peace processes and 
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development policy – since the coercive power that Norway could use in the form of 
military force or economic sanctions is limited, soft power is of major importance for 
the country (Nye 2004:5), which leads to the above mentioned wide consensus about 
the priorities of foreign policy.  
Furthermore, the absence of colonial past makes it easier for Norway to play an active 
role in the global South, since they are rarely accused of having strategic interests or 
underlying motives (Ford 2000). Finally, it is an important factor that Norway has the 
resources to finance these activities.  
Although the concept is mostly used to describe peace processes and cooperation in 
the field of development policy and humanitarian aid, I will discuss the “Norwegian 
model” in the field of security policy. My main intention is to analyse whether the 
close cooperation between the state and civil society also works in a policy area 
abundant with strategic interests and traditionally characterised by a closed approach, 
and to identify the factors and circumstances that enable this cooperation. The findings 
are of high relevance for assessing whether this Norwegian trademark can be 
“exported” and used by other states or international organisations, especially with the 
increasing popularity of governance arrangements in mind.  
 
Research Question and Research Design 
To narrow down the topic, I chose a specific policy area, the campaign and activism 
aiming for an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a universal agreement 
regulating the export of small arms and light weapons (SALW). As presented below in 
Chapter 1, the spread of SALW is identified as one of the major threats of the post-
Cold War security environment, with transnational and global impact. In 1998, the 
European Union (EU) created the first European arms control regime with the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (EU CoC), including SALW in the regulation. It 
did not remain a purely European regime, though, since many non-EU countries, such 
as Norway, Canada and the United States, signed the document (Bromley 2008). 
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NGOs played a determinant role in the birth of this regime – first of all, they put the 
topic on the agenda by raising attention through various campaigns. Furthermore, they 
participated in the decision-making process as consultants and helped to draft the text 
of the document (Anders 2005). On the other hand, private arms producers also made 
attempts to influence governmental views on the topic. Therefore, this policy area is 
ideal for the assessment of non-state actors‟ influence.  
Nevertheless, further specification of the research question is necessary, and thus I 
chose Norway as a case. In late 1997, Norwegian NGOs, such as the Norwegian Red 
Cross and Norwegian Church Aid, together with PRIO, funded NISAT (Norwegian 
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers), which is a major player in the policy field. In 
1998, the Norwegian government subscribed to the EU CoC, and among many other 
international agreement, it is actively supporting the ATT process. However, there are 
several aspects of the Norwegian export practices that are criticised by NGOs, such as 
the lack of end-user agreements in the case of NATO transfers, transparency and arms 
production in other countries by subsidiaries of Norwegian companies. The fact that 
there is a thriving arms industry with internationally successful corporations such as 
Kongsberg Gruppen and Nammo AS, makes the case even more suitable for the 
analysis of the role that NGOs play in a policy area abundant with strategic interests.  
My research questions are: 
Can the relationship between the Norwegian state and civil society in the case of the 
SALW issue best be described by security governance? 
Based on the findings, what are the enabling factors of successful state-NGO 
cooperation in security policy in the Norwegian case and how does this cooperation 
function? 
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In order to analyse the ”Norwegian model” and its applicability and relevance in other 
settings, I chose a qualitative research design, because I was interested in “how” and 
“why” questions rather than making predictions about future behaviour and frequency. 
Besides using documentary evidence as a source, I conducted ten interviews with key 
persons involved in the consultations both from the government and the NGO side. 
The data from these interviews are summarised in a separate chapter, before relating 
them to the theory and the research question, to keep the logic of the conclusions more 
transparent.  
 
The thesis will start by presenting the theoretical framework, describing the “security 
governance” theory by Krahmann placed in the wider context of governance in 
general, as well as theories on the role of civil society in international politics, 
including NGO strategies, tactics and dilemmas. Then, I will give a brief overview of 
the issue of small arms and light weapons – why SALW represent a security threat and 
how the trade in SALW is currently regulated by regional and international 
agreements, including a presentation of the Norwegian arms industry. This chapter is 
followed by the presentation of the research design, the empirical findings and the 
analysis of the interview material. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the most 
important findings and their significance for the research question, and assess the 
relevance of the model for the EU.  
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Chapter 1 The Concept of Governance 
 
In the following chapter, I intend to give an overview of the concept of governance in 
general, and arrive at a definition that is viable across a plethora of disciplines where 
the term is used. As a next step, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of “governance” 
as it is applied in political science in contrast to other academic fields. The aim is to 
place the concept of governance in security policy, developed by Elke Krahmann in a 
wider theoretical context before presenting it in detail.  
1.1. The Rise and Shine of Governance 
The last two decades have witnessed the growing popularity of the term „governance‟ 
across disciplines, such as economics, sociology and development studies, just to 
mention a few. Furthermore, the term has not only been used in a variety of research 
fields, but also by an overabundance of actors besides students of these disciplines,  
ranging from authors of party programmes to international organisations. Although the 
study of governance already started in the 1980s, it gained momentum with the end of 
the Cold War – the mushrooming of international organisations, be it 
intergovernmental or non-governmental in character, and private actors accompanied 
by the replacement of two antagonistic ideologies with a plurality of ideas proved to be 
a fertile ground for „governance‟. In a changed international environment, effective 
and efficient problem-solving and the co-operative state became the new buzzwords of 
the post-Cold War era (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006).  
At the national level, the 1970s and 1980s were characterised by a perceived crisis of 
governability and legitimacy, which triggered different responses by political leaders. 
While some states, such as France, attempted to address the problem with state 
expansionism and nationalisation, others embarked on an administrative reform coined 
New Public Management, with market-oriented solutions, privatisation and cost-
efficiency evaluations as underlying ideas (Goetz 2008). The above mentioned factors 
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have all contributed to the spread of governance both as a phenomenon and as a 
theoretical concept.  
According to Stoker (1998), the „governance‟ perspective should be regarded as a 
framework through which we can analyse reality. As every model, it simplifies the 
complexity of the real world, but it helps to identify important questions as well as 
problems that arise concerning the new way of government arrangements and of 
decision-making. He argues that the approach is not suitable for causal analysis and 
rarely contributes to normative theory. However, it does offer an organising 
framework for several phenomena and it shows scholars what is worthy of studying, 
thus enabling us to gain new insights about the topic.  
1.2. The Various Meanings of the Concept 
Nevertheless, the extreme popularity and broad application of the term did not result in 
a clear and subtle definition. On the contrary, different disciplines and different actors 
denote various meanings to the term. As it is shown by Thomas G. Weiss, if we take a 
look at one type of actors, even international organisations disagree on the definition – 
while the World Bank uses „governance‟ merely as a synonym for the process of 
governing and mainly in the context of „good governance‟, other organisations such as 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) use the term to characterise the 
form of government where civil groups and citizens can articulate their interests in the 
decision-making process (Weiss 2000). De Alcantara (1998) argues in her article that 
the donor and the international development community favours the term „governance‟ 
because it is void of political connotations, and recommendations concerning state 
reform can be presented in a rather technical way, without implying intervention in 
internal political affairs.  
When it comes to academics, an analysis conducted by Elke Krahmann based on the 
Social Science Citation Index showed that the concept had been applied in more than 
twenty different subject areas in the period between 1980 and 2000 (Krahmann 
2003b).  
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Also in political science, the overabundance of various meanings associated with the 
term „governance‟ prevails. Rhodes (1996) identifies six different uses of governance, 
ranging from the minimal state to self-organising networks – and that is alone in 
academic writings about the British political system.  
As it is demonstrated above, the concept is used and misused so widely and in often 
contrasting meanings that it seems almost impossible to agree on an overarching 
definition cutting through disciplines. Therefore, it could prove helpful to apply the 
classification offered by Jon Pierre to organise the various applications of 
“governance”. He identifies two broad meanings of the term, the first being “the 
empirical manifestation of state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in 
late twentieth century”, whereas the second meaning refers to the “conceptual or 
theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems”(Pierre 2000:3).  
 
Furthermore, the numerous applications of the term can be classified according to the 
level of analysis. The most varied usage can be found at the national level, referring to 
the political system, the public administration reform (New Public Management), 
coordination of specific policy areas and to corporate governance (Krahmann 2003b). 
At the regional level, academic discussion focuses on the EU, and thus on multi-level 
governance and the role of networks in the decision-making process, mostly in policy 
areas linked to the first pillar. While until the late 1980s, research focused on European 
integration and the transfer of national sovereignty to the Community level, the 
„governance turn‟ in European studies resulted in the analysis of the impact of 
European institutions on national policies and the sui generis nature of the EU. From 
the 1990s, studies focusing on „multi-level governance‟ and „network governance‟ 
started to gain popularity (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006).  
Concerning the global level, governance is mostly associated with international 
developmental policy, although different institutions have diverging underlying 
meanings when applying the term, as illustrated above. The concept of „good 
governance‟, however, is popular and widely used at all three levels.  
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1.3. Making an Advantage of the Disadvantage 
Nevertheless, the application of the term across various disciplines and by various 
actors without a clear definition does not necessarily amount to a disadvantage. If 
scholars agree on common characteristics and can find the similarities that link 
together the different meanings, „governance‟ can build a bridge between disciplines 
that usually do not take into account studies conducted by scholars associated with 
other subject areas when reviewing literature on the topic of governance (Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004).  
More specifically, by finding the similarities in the numerous definitions and meanings 
of the term and treating „governance‟ as a general phenomenon, analyses across 
different levels become comparable. This facilitates research on whether failures and 
problems are comparable across the different levels and solutions to these at one level 
are adaptable to another (Krahmann 2003b) 
Besides, if scholars can agree on a general definition of the term, application of the 
concept across different policy areas becomes possible, and will not be limited to the 
original policy field, namely international commerce.  
1.4. Definition 
The most significant defining factor concerning the concept of governance is the core 
assumption that it is distinct from government. While the traditional form of 
government is characterised by hierarchical decision-making, centralised authority and 
the use of coercion to implement policies, governance builds on common values and 
ideas, voluntary compliance and decentralised decision-making (Webber et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, most researchers would agree on the fact that governance refers to the 
process as well as state by which boundaries between public and private become 
blurred (Stoker 1998).  
Krahmann (2003a:11) defines governance „as the structures and processes that enable 
governmental and non-governmental actors to coordinate their independent needs and 
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interests through the making and implementation of policies in the absence of a 
unifying political authority‟. Concerning the national, regional and global level, the 
fragmentation of authority and a preference for market solutions can be regarded as 
common characteristics. Furthermore, the slightly different meanings applied at these 
levels are all rooted in ideas about the growth of global interdependence and neoliberal 
ideology. In contrast to the rather vertical approach of multi-level governance, 
Krahmann‟s definition points in the direction of a horizontal, inclusive partnership.  
Stoker (1998) emphasises that governance implies that government is not “a „stand 
alone‟ institution [anymore] divorced from wider societal forces” and that traditional 
tasks of the government are increasingly carried out by private service providers, 
whereas the involvement of these private and voluntary actors also in the decision-
making process is more and more common.  
A further characteristic that helps to define governance is that coordination among 
state and non-state actors is realised through networks. Networks are “sets of actors 
who share an interest in a specific issue area and are linked to each other through 
stable formal or informal relations” (Krahmann 2005a:14). Networks can encompass 
several types of relations, such as hierarchical and horizontal, and have the advantage 
of being flexible and easily adaptable to changing environments. Also, they facilitate 
the implementation of the subsidiarity principle, by offering differentiated solutions 
originating from the level of the stakeholders, in contrast to centrally imposed policies 
(ibid.:15).  
The move towards government arrangements bearing the characteristics of networks 
can manifest itself in various ways, such as internal re-organisation of governmental 
agencies and forming of formal and informal ties among public, private and voluntary 
actors.  
These changes that occurred to traditional government arrangements are well captured 
by the phrase „the hollowing out of the state‟, which refers to the process through 
which the state‟s authority becomes limited, as well as it is shared with other actors. 
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Although Rhodes (1996) describes the phenomenon referring to the British political 
system, his discussion is applicable to almost all Western European democracies. 
Basically, he argues that privatisation, the use of agencies as alternative delivery 
systems, the introduction of managerial accountability and clearer political control in 
the public administration (New Public Management), as well as the transfer of certain 
competencies to the European level have all resulted in the „hollowing out‟ of the 
state.  
Furthermore, the principal-agent relations characteristic of governance often lead to 
outcomes that do not always match the intentions. Still, the open-endedness and 
uncertainty of governance outcomes can be regarded as an advantage, making it more 
suitable for adapting to changing circumstances (Stoker 1998).  
Krahmann (2003) describes this phenomenon as the „fragmentation of authority‟ 
downwards (to local institutions and agencies), upwards (to the regional and global 
level) and sideways (by the participation of private and voluntary actors in decision-
making and implementation). In the following sections, I will present the role of the 
main participating actors in governance. The main focus will be given to the state and 
voluntary, non-governmental organisations, given that these two groups of actors are 
the most relevant concerning my research question.  
To sum up, governance is defined by the following characteristics: 
 It is distinct from „government” 
 The boundaries between public and private are blurred 
 Fragmented authority, non-hierarchical decision-making  
 The „hollowing out” of the state 
 Preference for market solutions  
 Policy formulation and implementation is carried out in association with private 
and voluntary actors 
 The coordination among state and non-state actors is realised through networks  
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1.5. The Role of States in Governance  
Nevertheless, the above mentioned characteristics of governance arrangements do not 
imply that the state has disappeared from the international stage.  Students of 
comparative government argue that it is misleading to dismiss the state as the centre of 
political power and regard it as a weakened institution from the past, and it is more 
fruitful to analyse how states adapt to the changed political environment and find ways 
of governing (Pierre 2000:5). Although states have undoubtedly lost authority to other 
actors, they still act as enablers and coordinators of the networks of public, private and 
voluntary actors that take part in decision-making and implementation. Policies agreed 
on by a mixture of different governmental, private and voluntary actors can only be 
implemented if they go through the established system of law-making and law 
enforcement, building on traditional institutions such as parliaments and courts. Thus, 
it can be argued that not only is governance compatible with the prevailing existence 
of states – governance is state-dependent (Goetz 2008).  
Even proponents of the governance perspective emphasise that states are still the 
dominant actors in the international arena. They have partly transferred sovereignty 
and authority downwards, upwards and sideways and have changed in character to 
become “cooperative”, “problem-solving” and “regulatory” states but their prevailing 
political power in decision-making and implementation is without doubt (Krahmann 
2005c).  
1.6. Governance in Security Policy 
Although academic research has mainly focused on governance in other policy areas, 
mostly international trade and the reform of public administration, the number of 
scholars who analyse the possibility of governance arrangements in security policy is 
growing.  
Elke Krahmann‟s “security governance‟‟ approach makes a convincing contribution to 
research on the applicability of governance as a theoretical framework for the analysis 
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of decision-making and implementation processes in security policy. She argues for an 
increase in intensity and frequency of consultations and solutions where a more 
important role is attributed to private and voluntary organisations. This, in a way, 
comes as a necessity, given the changed character of security policy in the post-Cold 
War era. Paraphrasing the title of her book, today‟s security policy is characterised by 
new threats and new actors (Krahmann 2005a).  
Furthermore, we can see a change in what is meant by “security” –according to the 
traditional narrow definition, security is about military force and material capabilities, 
and focus is on the protection of the citizens within a state‟s territory, in the fear of an 
invasion by the enemy. Based on this narrow conception, the analysis of security 
policy is centred on states and statesmen. In contrast, the broader definition 
differentiates between military, political, economic, social and environmental security 
threats (Katzenstein 1996), allowing for the inclusion of non-state actors in the 
analysis of security policy. Supplementing the traditional state-centred security 
concept, the term “human security” has increasingly gained popularity in the last 10-
15 years. Initially, when the term was first used by the UN and the UNDP Human 
Development Index for 1994, the concept was too broad and almost encompassed 
everything, making its application useless. Later, the concept was refined as a result of 
cooperation between the Canadian and the Norwegian government, limiting it to 
physical security threats (Matlary 2008). To sum up, “human security” centres on the 
individual and the threats that could harm or endanger its physical security and 
integrity, and thus has its roots in human rights (Matlary 2002:26-27).  
Krahmann identifies terrorism, international proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, spread of SALW, and HIV/AIDS as the ‟‟new security threats‟‟, whereas 
NGOs and private military/security companies are the ‟‟new actors‟‟ in security policy 
(Krahmann 2005a:5-6). However, as it is presented in the following chapter on civil 
society, these actors did not come to existence with the end of the Cold War, rather 
there was a trend resulting in their growing number and increased inclusion by 
governments and international organisations.  
 20 
 
According to Krahmann, “the fragmented but overlapping networks which structure 
the collaboration among the growing range of public and private security actors seem 
to be more adequately described by the concept of governance‟‟ (Krahmann 2003a), 
similarly to other policy sectors. With the weakening of the central authorities and 
their wish for improved input and output legitimacy, the new actors of security policy 
play a major role in the ‟‟formulation, implementation, and monitoring of international 
policies, rules, and regulations‟‟(Krahmann 2005a:12).   
1.6.1. The Seven Dimensions 
The participation of various private and voluntary actors results in the fragmentation of 
political authority, which can be observed along seven major dimensions, also 
applicable in other policy areas:  
 Geography: concerns the geographical scope of policy-making 
arrangements; government implies that the state is the key unit, while 
“governance is characterized by the fragmentation of political authority 
among regional, global, and transnational private entities”, and security 
functions are delegated to the regional level (NATO, EU).  
 Function: issue-specific division of labour among different actors.  
 Distribution of resources: contrary to the case when resources are held 
and redistributed by the government, in governance arrangements 
resources are dispersed among a number of various private and public 
actors, thus coordination is necessary.  
 Interests: governance presumes heterogeneous interests that can still 
coexist, whereas government builds on the assumption that individual 
interests should be subordinated to the common will.  
 Norms: typical government norms are state sovereignty, command and 
control and the ideal of redistribution, while governance is built on self-
government, marketization, cost-efficient security policy, and increasing 
limitation of national sovereignty.  
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 Decision-making in case of governance is characterised by „‟horizontal 
relations among state and non-state actors, negotiation, and structural 
inequality‟‟. 
 Policy implementation: decentralised, self-enforced and subject to 
voluntary compliance, in contrast to centralised and authoritative 
implementation. 
       (Krahmann 2005a.:12-14) 
 
1.7. Legitimacy and Accountability in Governance Arrangements 
However, Krahmann‟s theory not only captures the radical changes in security policy 
from government towards governance, but in the same time it does not neglect the 
potential negative implications that have already been studied in other policy areas. 
The most obvious problem described by Krahmann, associated with new modes of 
government is the occurrence of governance failures. They arise „‟when a shift from 
government to governance in some of the identified seven dimensions is not matched 
by congruent changes in the other dimensions‟‟ (Krahmann 2005c). An example could 
be the regulation and licensing of small arms export by nation states, while the 
production of SALW is scattered around in the world as a result of the transnational 
character of the armament industry.  
Furthermore, the fragmentation of authority in governance arrangements leads to 
diffuse legitimacy and accountability relations – in complex structures characteristic of 
governance, with several actors participating in the decision-making and 
implementation process, it is difficult to determine the exact institutions or persons 
who are responsible for a policy decision. The complexity inherent in governance 
facilitates blame avoidance and scapegoating – the more actors participate in the 
process, the more possibilities emerge for always blaming the others (Stoker 1998).  
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Moreover, according to Stoker, there is a mismatch between the normative codes 
traditionally used to legitimise government with clear accountability structures and the 
reality of decision-making in governance arrangements, leading to tensions manifested 
in the alienation and scepticism of citizens. Legitimacy is essential for the functioning 
of states and both policy formulation and successful implementation are dependent on 
whether citizens accept the actors as legitimate decision-makers. Therefore, the 
question of legitimacy needs to be addressed to gain back the trust of citizens, because 
governance arrangements are here to stay.  
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Chapter 2 Civil Society and the Role of 
NGOs in International Politics 
 
The absence of a clear definition and the particularly broad meaning of the term “civil 
society” are problematic, similarly to the case of “governance”. Cohen and Arato 
(1992:ix) define it as a “sphere of social interaction between economy and state, 
composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of 
associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of 
public communication”. Furthermore, in order to make it possible for civil society to 
fulfil its designated role and preserve its critical potential in established Western 
democracies, it is necessary to distance it from economic associations and the 
“bourgeois society”. Also, a distinction between political associations and civil society 
must be made (ibid.). The argument for the unique characteristics of civil society in 
contrast to the state and the market can be underpinned by a differentiation based on 
means and goals; civil society is non-violent and non-militant, and driven by collective 
goods instead of individual interests (Trenz 2007:90).  
Still, the definition provided by Cohen and Arato is too broad to be applied in the 
analysis of the role of NGOs in governance arrangements, and therefore I will exclude 
the “intimate sphere” and will concentrate on the “sphere of associations” or the 
“organised civil society”, in order to arrive at a more specific working definition. By 
defining civil society as an intermediary area between the state, the market and the 
private sphere, the concept does not result in the abolition of the state as an underlying 
institution (Trenz 2007:90), which makes it compatible also with approaches outside 
the neoliberal and cosmopolitan traditions. 
The “sphere of associations” can be further differentiated as consisting of grassroots or 
community-based organisations at the local level, NGOs at the national level, and 
transnational networks with a reach beyond national borders. Networks where 
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principled ideas, values and norms are central motivations for their formation and 
where members of the organisations often represent interests other than their own are 
termed advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998:8). In my analysis, the main focus 
will be given to advocacy groups at the national level that are embedded in a 
transnational context, either through the establishment of networks consisting of 
national groups in various countries, or through being a local affiliate of transnational 
advocacy groups, such as Amnesty International or the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement.  
2.1. Non-Governmental Organisations in International Politics 
The participation of civil society in politics is not a new phenomenon, and as it is 
demonstrated by Keck and Sikkink (1998), neither is the role that transnational 
advocacy networks play in international politics. However, the proliferation of various 
non-governmental groups and the increased intensity of their activism are novel – the 
spread of modern technology and the increased accessibility of air travel have all 
contributed to the emergence of transnational and global networks, connecting 
activists all over the world and providing them with valuable information. The latter is 
of major importance, because their ability to quickly generate and deploy credible 
information is their most valuable currency (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16).  
In addition, the wish to include NGOs in the decision-making, policy formulation and 
implementation process by international organisations is undoubtedly a new 
phenomenon.  Since the 1980s, the United Nations (UN) and related agencies such as 
the UNDP have been open-minded and supportive in terms of the inclusion of NGOs 
in their activities, also as a result of increased perception of legitimacy problems 
associated with the functioning of international organisations. Moreover, the UN 
acknowledges the contributions of NGOs in providing relief and finding solutions that 
are better fitted for local conditions. Thus, the inclusion of the private and voluntary 
sector is not merely motivated by institutional reforms aiming for improved legitimacy 
and more democratic decision-making in the eyes of the citizens, but also sees the new 
method as a possibility to increase efficiency (Kamat 2004). Accordingly, the renewed 
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interest in civil society and the treatment of civil activists as partners rather than 
opponents can be linked to the growing popularity of governance approaches and the 
search for improved efficiency in the framework of market-oriented solutions as an 
answer to the government crises in Western democracies (see Chapter 1).  
Besides the above mentioned roles designated to civil society, their contribution to the 
dissemination of information and the channelling of unintended implications of policy 
making from the perspective of the stakeholders to decision-makers are of high 
importance (Charrad 2008). Furthermore, they have a crucial role in agenda-setting, 
articulation of new values and norms, altering institutions to respond to unmet needs 
and the spread of social innovations (Brown et al. 2000:283).  
In terms of the EU, the fact that Irish citizens voted against the ratification of the 
Treaty of Nice in June 2001 and the growing intensity of the debate concerning the 
democratic deficit of the EU resulted in the “White Paper on Governance” by the 
European Commission, calling for open methods of consultation and attributing a 
more important role for organised civil society in the forming and implementation of 
European policies (Commission 2001). As Kohler-Koch puts it, by introducing 
participatory democracy besides representative democracy, the EU followed two 
“trendy belief systems” of the time, namely governance and scepticism about the 
legitimacy guaranteed by elections, party politics and accountability exercised through 
the parliament (Kohler-Koch 2009). Thus, similarly to the above mentioned 
international organisations, the active participation of civil society was seen as the 
ultimate cure for the democratic deficit and the legitimacy crisis in the EU, improving 
both input and output legitimacy and efficiency.  
 
2.2. Watchdog or Partner? 
The closer cooperation with civil society in international governance  is associated 
with two underlying roles assigned to civil society: enhancing democracy, public 
accountability and legitimacy as a remedy to the perceived democratic deficit of the 
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international organisations on the one hand, and improving the quality of decisions as 
a solution for the efficiency problems on the other hand (Steffek and Ferretti 2009). 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of civil society in governance arrangements based on the 
rationale of accountability and legitimacy claims entails a completely different role 
than that based on “epistemic claims”, that is, the improvement of the quality of policy 
making.  
Cooperation based on accountability claims entails that NGOs have to live up to the 
expectations of being a “watchdog” in the form of post hoc evaluation of outcomes, as 
well as mobilising public resistance. In order to be able to do that, they have to uphold 
an independent status, acting outside and against the state, because only this way can 
they truly improve the legitimacy and democratic character of decisions. In contrast, 
participation based on epistemic claims results in civil society being a partner, closely 
cooperating with governments and international organisations, improving the quality 
of policy decision by providing information and expert knowledge on the issue at hand 
(Hendriks 2006). However, this can lead to organised civil society being co-opted in 
the process –  according to Karp, in the case of the small arms campaign, as a “result 
of a Faustian bargain with sympathetic governments”, NGOs and research institutes 
lost their independent and critical voice. Because their activities and campaigns are 
funded by the government and they are often accredited as members of national 
delegations at international conferences, controversial issues are left undiscussed, and 
the official agenda gradually becomes theirs (Karp 2006). Furthermore, research in the 
case of the EU has shown that the funding of campaigns and projects associated with 
specific issues prioritised by the EU has led to adaptation mechanisms among the 
NGO community – they tend to select topics that have the best chances of getting EU 
funds, neglecting other issues that are equally important (Trenz 2007:103). Thus, the 
system of EU funding and the agenda-setting role of the EU makes organised civil 
society dependent on EU institutions (Eising 2007).  
Furthermore, the participation of civil society in negotiations leading to decisions in a 
specific policy area is problematic from the perspective of the principles associated 
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with deliberative democracy. Deliberation presupposes that the participants are open 
for the adjustment of their views and demands, resulting in a decision or policy 
outcome that is acceptable by everyone. However, representatives of interest groups 
and social movements have very specific agendas that they are expected to pursue, and 
thus they often have to choose between being a valuable member of the negotiations or 
an advocate of their organisations. Moreover, participation in consultations implies 
that the community of NGOs is represented by a small number of activists, which is 
potentially elitist and exclusive, questioning the democratic qualities of civil society 
involvement (Hendriks 2006).  
2.3. Strategies and Tactics 
In order to understand the actions of NGOs better, I will in the following section 
present the main strategies they apply. Since NGOs are not in the possession of 
resources that would make them powerful in the traditional sense, they have to seek 
other strategies to reach their goals. Keck and Sikkink (1998:18-25) describe four 
tactics that transnational advocacy networks actively use and that can also be applied 
to national and local groups: 
1. Information politics 
As mentioned above, information is the most valuable asset that NGOs have at their 
disposal. Networks and groups disseminate information in both directions: they collect 
perceptions about the negative implications of policies at the local level and articulate 
them to governments or international institutions, but they also provide information to 
the stakeholders concerning policy decisions. Thanks to their contacts with the local 
level, they can identify and investigate problems, and make them a part of the political 
agenda.  
“Framing” is a central concept in their strategies: they attract attention to their causes 
by using a language that dramatises the issue at hand, and often puts it in another 
context than it was discussed before.  The spread of HIV/AIDS, for instance, was 
treated as a medical problem in the beginning, but through the effective framing by 
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NGOs it was transformed into being a question of human rights and socioeconomic 
development (Jönsson and Söderholm 1995). As a consequence of the emergence of a 
broader concept of “human security” in the post-Cold War era, the spread of 
HIV/AIDS is now even presented as a security threat, with implications for a more 
conventional security framework, as well (Elbe 2005:111).  It comes as no surprise 
that describing an issue as a potential security threat with consequences for the 
military personnel and UN peacekeepers will draw more attention than presenting it 
“simply” as a medical and developmental problem.   
2. Symbolic politics 
This strategy builds on invoking symbols that make sense of issues at hand even for 
people far away from the stakeholders, or interpreting actions and events in a symbolic 
manner.  
3. Leverage politics 
Given that NGOs are not powerful in the traditional sense, in order to be successful, 
they have to “leverage” more powerful actors and pressure them to alter their policies. 
The use of material leverage is mostly realised through governments and international 
institutions, for instance by delivering financial aid on the condition of improvements 
in human rights practices. On the other hand, moral leverage is associated with the 
“mobilization of shame”, a strategy based on the assumption that actors wish to 
preserve a good picture of themselves in the eyes of others. This is what Dembinski 
and Joachim term “beauty contest, peer pressure and best practice” in the case of the 
implementation of the EU CoC (Dembinski and Joachim 2006).  
4. Accountability politics 
Governments and international institutions often make public announcements about 
their policy changes and dedication to certain values and norms. It can prove to be an 
effective tactic to remind them of their previous statements and contrast these with 
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practice, because both states and institutions have a desire to be seen as trustworthy 
and credible.  
These strategies can rarely be observed one-by-one; they are mostly employed 
simultaneously or are stages within a campaign. In the initial phase of a campaign, 
NGOs have to gather information and then frame the issue in a way that it can build on 
symbols that help to understand it better. Later, they use moral leverage to convince 
governments to make public commitments about policy changes and the adoption of 
new norms and values. Thus, they can use these announcements to hold governments 
accountable and make them implement the changes they pledged (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:26).  
2.4. Non-Governmental Organisations in Security Policy 
After the presentation of the concept of civil society and the role of NGOs in 
international politics, especially in governance arrangements, I will now turn to the 
question of whether organised civil society is active in the field of security policy and 
whether they can influence government and institutional positions to the same extent 
as in the case of other policy areas. Academic research has mostly focused on the role 
of civil society and the occurrence  of governance in the first pillar of the EU, though 
studies concerning the second and third pillar are also starting to draw more attention 
(Krahmann 2003a; Dembinski and Joachim 2006).  
According to the “co-evolution thesis” put forward by Kohler-Koch (1996:209), the 
intensity and organisation of interest representation in a policy area tends to mirror the 
depth of integration in this area. As more and more competencies are transferred to the 
European level, resulting also in a growing number of people affected by the 
decisions, we would expect the proliferation of civil society organisations active at the 
supranational level. In the case of the second pillar, as the European institutions 
increasingly gained competence in policy-making, NGOs with a security policy focus 
did in fact become more active in the European arena. Especially groups in the realm 
of development aid, catastrophe aid, human rights policy and environmental policy 
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engaged themselves in supranational settings, but even organisations focusing on 
issues considered being the core areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) proliferated in Brussels. They are mostly present in the form of networks, such 
as the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation or the European 
affiliate of the International Action Network on Small Arms (Dembinski and Joachim 
2006).  
Thus, as it is presented above, there is no doubt about the presence and activity of 
organised civil society in the field of security policy.  
The Peculiarities of Security Policy 
On the other hand, the answer to the second question, namely the extent of the impact 
NGOs can have on security policy, is not so clear. As it is put forward by Dembinski 
and Joachim (2008), the CFSP is a relatively new field in the family of Europeanised 
policy areas, and thus the gradual deepening of integration in the CFSP could possible 
bring about the increased influence of NGOs. Already in the 1990s, supranational 
institutions managed to build competencies in the area of CFSP (such as the High 
Representative or the Political and Security Committee-PSC), providing more 
opportunities for civil society involvement.  
Nevertheless, the peculiarities of security policy can very well pose barriers to the 
effective and efficient participation of organised civil society in the second pillar. 
Decision-making in CFSP competencies is still mainly intergovernmental in its 
character. Therefore, private and voluntary actors have considerably less possibilities 
and access points to influence policy formulation and implementation. The realm of 
foreign and security policy is still regarded as the field of executive prerogatives – 
questions of legitimacy and accountability rarely arise in the context of CFSP, and the 
participation of civil society is not desired by decision-makers (Dembinski and 
Joachim 2008). Security policy decisions are traditionally seen as the privilege of 
statesmen, and questioning the democratic accountability of these decisions seems 
unlikely. Since the decisions concern the survival of the nation, it has been accepted 
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for centuries that security policy requires secrecy and efficient decision-making, which 
requires the participation of a small number of actors (Sjursen 2008). However, as it is 
presented above, the concept of “security” is changing and the number and variety of 
actors involved are increasing, similarly to other policy areas.  
While in the first pillar the Commission actively seeks the inclusion of NGOs and 
private actors in decision-making as a remedy to legitimacy problems and democratic 
deficit (Kohler-Koch 1996, 2007), a similar trend in the second and third pillar is not 
visible. Although development and humanitarian aid are often channelled through 
international and local NGOs, currently, their impact on policy formulation and 
decision-making is neglectable (Dembinski and Joachim 2008). 
The foreign and security policy of the EU has a further characteristic that makes NGO 
involvement problematic. As mentioned above, according to the co-evolution theory, 
with the deepening and widening of European integration, decisions have an impact on 
a growing number of citizens, spurring increased interest representation (Kohler-Koch 
1996:198). Yet, in the case of the CFSP, these “stakeholders” affected by European 
policy decisions are outside the borders of the EU. Diplomatic relations between 
member states can hardly be regarded as foreign policy, and thus the CFSP mainly 
encompasses the foreign relations of the EU as an entity with third countries. As a 
result, European non-governmental organisations do not qualify as “stakeholders” in 
the case of security policy, and their representativity and credibility are questioned by 
European institutions (Dembinski and Joachim 2008).  
On the other hand, the fact that the people to be represented by civil society 
organisations are not EU citizens and thus there is no direct representative link 
between them does not necessarily mean that the representativity and credibility of 
these organisations should be put in doubt. As it is argued by Trenz (2008), the 
typology of different forms of representation offered by Mansbridge (2003) can also 
be applied to civil society. According to this characterisation, surrogate representation 
refers to the case when there is no direct electoral link present in the representative 
relation, neither are there structures established to channel accountability claims. 
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Basically, NGOs choose a group of people that they, based on shared norms, values 
and ideologies within the organisation, wish to represent and defend (Trenz 2008). 
Nevertheless, the absence of a direct relationship and mechanisms of accountability 
should not lead to the conclusion that these organisations are illegitimate – the 
problem lies in the fact that  the legitimacy of surrogate representation is measured in 
terms accountability developed in the framework of the traditional “promissory 
representation” (Mansbridge 2003). As Trenz (2008) puts it, “(t) he legitimacy of 
surrogate representation (...) lies in the performative act of representation itself, 
through which a particular person claims to speak for somebody else and in the general 
resonance, which this performative act creates within a wider audience (which is not 
identical with the constituent)”. Therefore, the exclusion of civil society in the case of 
security policy based on the argument that their constituents are outside the EU is not 
justified.  
In spite of the institutional barriers and the suspicions of European institutions, it is 
still possible to find examples when civil society successfully penetrated foreign and 
security policy. As it is demonstrated by the study of the small arms movement and its 
impact on the EU CoC by Dembinski and Joachim (2006, 2008), NGOs can play a 
crucial role in enhancing transparency, and by using “leverage politics” and 
“accountability politics” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16), they can push for the 
improvement and better implementation of existing regulations in the field of security 
policy. Although the active campaign that followed the adoption of the EU CoC in 
1998 can better be explained by placing it in a governance framework, the birth of the 
European small arms regime can only be accounted for by applying an 
intergovernmental perspective (Dembinski 2006). Thus, the role that NGOs can play 
in the decision-making and policy formulation phase of foreign and security policy 
needs to be further explored.  
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Chapter 3 The SALW Issue  
 
3.1.  The Significance of SALW 
 
The spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is one of the most significant 
security threats of today, as it is illustrated by the fact that the use of SALW can be 
made responsible for over 740,000 deaths yearly (UNDP 2008). They are “the number 
one killers of combatants and innocents alike in conflicts around the world” (Holtom 
2008:7). With the end of the Cold War, the international community increasingly 
focused on intrastate conflicts and civil wars, and more and more attention was given 
to SALW as contributors and multipliers of armed violence (Anders 2005:178).  
 
Small arms „are those weapons designed for personal use and capable of being carried 
by an individual, e.g. pistols, rifles, submachine guns and assault rifles‟”, whereas light 
weapons are defined as weapons that are easily portable „but sometimes require a team 
to operate them. They include heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade 
launchers, anti-aircraft guns, mortars, recoilless rifles and man-portable anti-aircraft 
missile systems”(Jackson et al. 2005:10). According to estimates, there around 875 
million small arms and light weapons in circulation, with around 75% being owned by 
civilians (UNDP 2008).  
 
The negative consequences of the spread and use of SALW cover various aspects and 
dimensions. SALW play a major role in transnational crime, drug trafficking and civil 
wars. Furthermore, although the main focus in counterterrorism efforts is given to 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, SALW, and especially 
light weapons such as MANPADS (man-portable air-defence systems) capable of 
carrying out attacks on aircrafts undoubtedly have relevance for international terrorism 
(Stevenson 2005). Thus, they are of paramount importance for the post-Cold War 
security environment.  
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On the other hand, the proliferation of SALW has devastating socioeconomic 
consequences for human development, such as access to health, education and social 
services, as well as investment and trade (OECD 2009:13). Furthermore, the 
widespread use of SALW often makes it impossible for humanitarian organisations to 
reach people in need (Jackson et al. 2005). A further aspect is the role that SALW play 
in contributing to and facilitating violations of human rights (Oxfam and International 
2003:8), as well as international humanitarian law. A common factor for the above 
mentioned aspects however is that the negative impacts of SALW mostly affect the 
global South and developing countries in general (Jackson et al. 2005:13), which 
explains the active engagement of humanitarian and development organisations in the 
field of SALW control in recent years.    
 
3.2.  International and regional regulations concerning SALW 
 
The vast majority of SALW that are in circulation today started out as legally 
produced and transferred weapons. However, insufficient legal control of global 
conventional arms flows often leads to a transition from the legal market to the grey 
zone, and finally to the black market (Bourne 2005:160), making SALW available also 
for non-state actors (insurgent groups, criminal groups, terrorists, etc.) who would 
otherwise not be granted access to them. The most frequent way of SALW acquisition 
is the theft, capture or corrupt purchase of government weapons, as well as trade by 
black market arms brokers (Jackson et al. 2005:53).  
 
Thus, the proliferation of SALW and their wide use and abuse is a complex and 
complicated issue, and initiatives aiming at regulating arms transfers have a tendency 
to address only one or a few aspects of it. The first breakthrough in the sense of raising 
awareness came with the UN Secretary General mentioning the devastating effects of 
SALW in a 1995 speech, asking for coordinated measures to counter the security 
threat posed by SALW. Consequently, the proliferation of SALW was officially lifted 
to the level of major security threats (Anders 2005:179).  
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One of the most comprehensive and efficient regional initiatives to control arms 
transfers is the European SALW export control regime, based on the EU CoC. 
European cooperation in the field of arms control goes back as far as the 1960s, in the 
framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). However, the experiences 
during the Gulf War showed that in the absence of a common European regulation for 
arms exports, decisions by certain member states not to export weapons to Iraq can 
easily be undermined by other member states selling arms to the same country. In 
order to combat these shortcomings, the members of the European Community 
decided to set up an ad hoc working group known as the COARM group, with the aim 
of establishing common criteria for exports of conventional arms. Still, EC members 
had a tendency to interpret the criteria differently and the need to harmonise national 
legislation arose (ibid.). The result was the EU CoC in 1998, requesting denial 
notifications, consultation mechanisms and an annual report besides common criteria 
for arms exports, thereby significantly contributing to transparency and efficient 
export control (Bromley 2008). The idea of an EU CoC arose already as early as 
1991/1992, as a result of discussions between non-governmental experts on the topic. 
In May 1995, NGOs led by the UK-based Saferworld, supported by international 
lawyers and other partners, drafted a model for the EU CoC, which increasingly 
gained popularity among a broad spectrum of NGOs all over the world (Anders 
2005:185)
1
. It was, however, still imperfect and further issues had to be addressed, 
such as arms brokering – the arrangement of transfer between buyers and sellers. This 
led to the EU Common Position on Arms Brokering in 2003, with an obligation to 
license brokering activities on EU territory, whereas outside the EU, licensing is only 
recommended (ibid.). In December 2008, the EU CoC became legally binding, further 
strengthening its role and efficiency.  
Other regional initiatives include the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 
Related Materials; The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons; Protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and 
                                                          
1
 On the role of NGOs in the process leading to the EU Code of Conduct see Anders 2005.  
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other related material in the Southern African Development Community; and The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Related Materials. Guidelines that are not 
legally binding include the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons from 2000 and the Code of 
Conduct of the States of Central America (SICA) on the Transfer of Arms, Munitions, 
Explosives and Related Materiel from 2005 (Wallacher and Silva 2008:12).  
 
At the international level, in 2001 member states of the United Nations accepted the 
UN Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was an important step in 
combating illegal arms brokering (Holm et al. 2006:43). However, it does not regulate 
the legal export and trade of arms and neither is it legally binding. In 2003, the UN 
Register of Conventional Arms opened for the possibility of reporting the transfer of 
SALW in the register as additional background information, though on a voluntary 
basis for “interested” member states, “using definitions and reporting methods they 
deem appropriate”. Since 2006 it is also possible to use a standardised reporting form 
(UN 2007:12).  
Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN 
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol) entered into force in 2006, 
with all member states having signed and ratified the document (UN 2005).  
Furthermore, The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is also of 
high importance, because it established a link between armed violence and the 
proliferation of small arms on the one hand, and development and human security on 
the other hand. In addition, it stresses that armed violence threatens the respect of 
human rights and hampers providing humanitarian assistance (The Geneva 
Declaration2006).  
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Thus, as demonstrated above, although there are several existing regulations and 
guidelines concerning international arms trade, most of them address separate 
dimensions of the SALW issue, and they either cover only a region or are not legally 
binding. Therefore, in December 2006, 153 member states of the UN agreed on the 
necessity of an international ATT (Wallacher and Silva 2008:3). The aim is to agree 
on a “comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” in the future. 
Furthermore, the resolution reaffirms the role of conventional arms transfers as a 
“contributory factor to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and terrorism, 
thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable 
development” (UN Res. 61/89. 2006).  
 
The future ATT is still in the process of formulation and negotiations, and thus it is 
difficult to see whether it will be successful in regulating the flow of arms. There are 
fears that opposing countries will block the negotiations, or that the ATT will use a 
narrow definition of SALW, excluding ammunitions, components, parts and licensed 
production or even worse, would not cover small arms at all. However, during the 
recent meeting of the Open Ended Working Group on an Arms Trade Treaty in March 
2009, none of the participating states were explicitly against including small arms in 
the ATT, and only a few voiced their concerns about the inclusion of ammunitions. All 
in all, with the possible support of the United States that until the change of 
administration opposed the ATT and the generally constructive contributions by 
member states, some interpret the experiences from the meeting as a step towards a 
successful future treaty (Wallacher 2009).  
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3.3.   The Norwegian Export Control Regime and the Arms Industry 
 
From the above mentioned treaties and guidelines, Norway aligned itself with the 
documents agreed on by the members of the UN and the OSCE, and is an active 
supporter of an international ATT. Although Norway is not a member of the EU, the 
country subscribed to the EU CoC and the export control section in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) follows the criteria set by the agreement when deciding on 
export licenses (Holm et al. 2006:44).  
 
The major arms producers in Norway are Kongsberg Gruppen and the Nammo Group. 
A part of Kongsberg, Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace is the leading supplier of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces and often develops its high-technology weapon systems in 
cooperation with them or with international partners. The main products are command 
and weapon control systems, surveillance systems, communications solutions and anti-
ship missiles, but Kongsberg also “makes advanced composites and engineering 
products for the aircraft and helicopter market” (Kongsberg 2009). The corporation 
was founded in 1987 and the shares of the Norwegian state amount 50,001%, 
administered by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MiTI). Kongsberg is 
internationally renowned for delivering high-technology products, and the revenues 
originating from foreign markets made up 67% of the total revenues in 2005 (NHD 
2006:82).  
Nammo AS was founded in 1998 and was a result of the “merger of ammunition 
activities of three major Nordic defence companies; Celsius AB, Patria Industries Oyj 
and Raufoss ASA” (Nammo 2009). Nammo AS is the mother company of Nammo 
Raufoss AS, Nammo Sweden AB, Nammo Lapua OY in Finland, Nammo Buck 
GmbH in Germany, and Nammo Inc. in the United States. According to the Small 
Arms Survey 2003, Nammo was the third largest producer of military small arms 
ammunition at that time (Harang 2008:25). The corporation manufactures 
ammunitions and missile & space propulsion products, besides providing 
demilitarisation services. Between 2001 and 2005 the ratio of the revenues originating 
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from export increased from 50% to 60%, with the main importers being the Nordic 
countries, the US, Canada and other NATO countries (NHD 2006:84). Nammo is 
famous for the production of its 12.7 mm multipurpose ammunitions for use against 
material targets (Nammo 2009). However, this ammunition, especially the version 
called NM140 in Norway or MK 211 in the US, is heavily criticised in terms of 
international humanitarian law – although Nammo describes it as an anti-material 
ammunition, it has been documented that the MK  211 is used against human targets 
by the Australian and the US Army. There is a wide debate about whether this 
ammunition can be regarded as a dum-dum bullet based on the unacceptably extensive 
damage it causes for people being shot, and thus it is the most controversial 
ammunition manufactured and exported by Nammo (Harang 2008:35).  
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Chapter 4 Research Design 
 
In order to analyse the “Norwegian model” in security policy, I chose a qualitative 
research design, because I was interested in “how” and “why” questions rather than 
making predictions about future behaviour and frequency. My intention was to gain 
insight about the way both NGO staff and government officials perceive the unique 
symbiosis between the state and the civil society in Norway, and about the conditions 
and characteristics that facilitate the efficient functioning of the “Norwegian model”. 
According to Devine (2002:199), qualitative methods are the right choice if “the goal 
of research is to explore people‟s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach 
to those experiences”, and thus it was a logical choice to apply a qualitative research 
design for my analysis.  
4.1. Choice of case 
I decided to use a single-case research design, because the depth of the analysis was 
more important than the breadth, as the main goal was to understand what the 
cooperation between the state and civil society involves and whether this cooperation 
can best be described by the concept of security governance. However, due to the use 
of several subunits the research constitutes an embedded single-case study, which in 
contrast to holistic research designs has the advantage of preserving the initial focus of 
the analysis as it proceeds (Yin 2003:42).  
The landmines and the cluster ammunition campaigns are the most frequently used 
examples for demonstrating the impact of civil society on government decisions 
concerning arms control, and the potentials of state-NGO cooperation. However, in 
these cases the goal of the campaigns was the complete ban of certain types of arms 
that were not strategically necessary for pursuing military objectives and had no 
advantages compared to other types of arms. Therefore, the campaigns did not really 
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challenge state interests and the goals articulated by civil society were clear-cut and 
simple.  
On the other hand, the issue of small arms control has a completely different character. 
None of the NGOs currently active in the field strive for a complete ban of SALW.  
Their goals concerning an international treaty regulating the export of SALW are 
significantly more nuanced, e.g. the inclusion of human rights aspects when assessing 
arms export, request of an end-user assurance, marking and tracing of ammunitions. 
This results in more complicated and detailed discussions about the topic with more 
frequent opposition on the part of governments, for instance by Middle Eastern states 
who are worried about the abuse of the human rights criteria as a tool for hindering 
them in acquiring arms, while the prohibition of arms sales to non-state actors is 
opposed by the United States
2
 (Wallacher 2009). Furthermore, the civil society itself is 
divided on the topic, with powerful organisations like the National Rifle Organisation 
in the United States lobbying against strict arms control, or the World Forum on the 
Future of Sport Shooting Activities. Moreover, while landmines represented a 
proportionally small amount of profit for arms producers, SALW provide important 
revenues for producers (O'Dwyer 2006). Therefore, the small arms campaign as such 
represents a more complex case, with aspects that can be linked to traditional national 
security issues and strategic interests, and thus with more relevance for the analysis of 
governance arrangements in security policy.   
Furthermore, since I use Krahmann‟s security governance theory as the organising 
framework, the case of small arms export regulations was an ideal choice, because it is 
presented both as a new security threat and as an example where policy formulation 
and decision-making in security policy are characterised by governance arrangements 
(Krahmann 2005a:6). As a more specific and well-defined case I chose the 
cooperation of Norwegian NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regards the 
current small arms and light weapons (SALW) export regulations and the nascent 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Although Anders‟ chapter (2005) in Krahmann‟s book 
                                                          
2
 The position of the Obama administration concerning the Arms Trade Treaty is in the process of formulation, 
but it is expected that the new US administration will have a more favourable view towards the ATT.  
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describes the process leading to the adoption of the EU CoC, the present efforts aiming 
for an international ATT can be compared to the aforementioned case, though the level 
of regulation is shifted from the regional to the international level. Thus, the subject of 
my analysis can be regarded as a “crucial case” for the security governance theory, 
which further legitimises the focus on one single case (George and Bennett 2005:121-
122). On the other hand, according to Dembinski and Joachim (2006), the process that 
resulted in the creation of the EU CoC could be better explained by applying an 
intergovernmental perspective, in contrast to the adjustments and amendments that 
followed the ratification of the document, characterised by strong NGO involvement. 
The presence of two competing theories accounting for the initial policy formulation 
and decision-making phase enables the assessment of the usefulness of Krahmann‟s 
perspective, while the analysis of NGO activity aiming for the adjustment and 
improvement of current SALW regulations helps in gaining insight about the 
characteristics of and ideal conditions for state-NGO cooperation in a less disputed and 
more clear-cut case.  
4.2. Method  
For the analysis of the research question I applied a combination of documentary 
evidence and informant interviews to ensure that as many sources of evidence as 
possible are used in order to increase the quality of the research (Yin 2003:97). As 
documentary evidence, I used campaign brochures, political declarations, newspaper 
articles and reports by NGOs, articles written by researchers, as well as summary 
reports published by the MFA and protocols of public hearings in the Parliament. I 
was also granted access to the extensive document library of the Norwegian Initiative 
on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), containing data on international authorised trade in 
SALW, as well as articles on small arms issues. 
However, it is important to be aware of possible reporting bias and to keep in mind 
that documents are produced for a specific audience with a specific aim, although they 
are relatively trustworthy sources in describing reality (Yin 2003:87).  
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In order to gain insight about the personal experiences, motives and interpretations of 
civil society and governmental officials (Devine 2002:201), and to balance the above 
mentioned bias, I conducted focused interviews with key persons involved in the 
consultations on SALW control. Since my interviewees had an excessive knowledge 
about the topic and were generally resource rich, it was important to be aware of the 
tendency of key informants to steer conversations so that it fits their own agenda, 
making it necessary for the interviewer to play a more active role than in other cases 
(Andersen 2006).  
The first two interviews I conducted with researchers, both to gather information about 
the topic and to test my questions in a genuine setting. After these interviews I slightly 
modified my questions and added some aspects that were not covered previously.  
The interviews were conducted in Oslo, Norway within a period of three weeks, 
between the 20
th
 of March and 29
th
 of April, 2009, with each interview lasting for 
approximately 60 minutes. 
I decided to record the interviews because it helped me in concentrating on the 
conversation itself instead of focusing on taking notes. None of the interviewees 
refused being recorded, and I always started with a question about their background 
and role in the organisation to make them feel at ease. Also, I always stated that the 
interview would be confidential and anonymous, both when requesting a meeting and 
at the meeting itself. Since the NGO community in Norway is small, stating the name 
of an interviewee‟s organisation would make my informants identifiable, and thus I 
will refer to them as “NGO employee”. Similarly, in the case of government officials, 
they will be referred to as “State employee”. However, in order to indicate clearly 
whether it was the same person who had a certain position concerning the different 
issues, I assigned a number to each interview and specified the date by using footnotes.  
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4.3. Sampling 
As mentioned above, the Norwegian NGO community is a small one, and thus it was 
possible to interview representatives from almost all organisations that are active in the 
field of SALW export regulations. In order to identify the relevant organisations I used 
protocols of public hearings, where all the participating NGOs were documented 
(Stortinget 2008). However, the public hearing in October 2008 was on the Norwegian 
export of military materiel in general, and therefore it was necessary to filter the 
participating organisations according to whether they have worked with the SALW 
export issue, and whether they are still active. In order to do that, I used their websites 
where political positions and topics of interest are published. As a result, I did not 
include Pugwash, Nei til atomvåpen (No to Nuclear Weapons), Norske leger mot 
atomvåpen (Norwegian Physicians against Nuclear Weapons) and Internasjonal 
Kvinneliga for Fred og Frihet (Women‟s International League for Peace and 
Freedom). A further organisation, Forum for Utvikling og Miljø (Forum for 
Development and Environment) was also present at public hearings and has policies 
regarding SALW issues. However, they are a network of different NGOs working with 
development and environmental issues, and since most of the NGOs I interviewed are 
a member of this network, the further insights that could have been gained by an 
interview with a representative of this organisation are limited.  To corroborate the 
resulting list, I asked my interviewees to name other NGOs relevant in the field of 
SALW export control. 
I combined this method of sample generation with “semi-snowball sampling”, because 
it was often difficult to identify the persons in charge of small arms issues at the 
relevant organisations. During the first two interviews that I conducted with 
researchers, I asked them to recommend possible interviewees, though I did not follow 
the principle of snowball sampling in the course of subsequent interviews. The NGO 
community in Norway is not only small, but also extremely interconnected – many of 
them meet on a daily basis, have lunch together and cooperate on various issues. 
Therefore, I wanted to avoid that they discuss the questions I asked from one of them 
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with NGO employees that I intended to interview in the future, as well as generating a 
sample from one network of people with similar characteristics (Devine 2002:205). It 
is still possible that such discussions have taken place, but the risks are considerably 
lower.  
Furthermore, at the end of each interview I asked whether the interviewee knew of any 
organisations that wanted to be included in consultations and public hearings but did 
not have the opportunity. My aim with this question was to minimise the possibility of 
only interviewing the “privileged ones”, although there is still no guarantee that I did 
not leave out an organisation active in the field of SALW export controls. 
Nevertheless, my sample can still be regarded as representative of the Norwegian 
NGO community, and since the general aim of my study was to explore the 
characteristics and facilitating conditions of the Norwegian model, the lack of insights 
from marginal NGOs in the field who are not included in consultations with the 
government does not weaken the value of my findings.  
The final sample includes different types of organisations, ranging from youth NGOs 
and religious associations to research institutes, and the organisations vary also in 
terms of being a purely Norwegian initiative or an affiliate of an international NGO.  
I interviewed employees of the following organisations:  
 International Peace Research Institute Oslo/NISAT 
 Norwegian Red Cross 
 Norwegian Church Aid 
 Changemaker (youth organisation of the Norwegian Church Aid) 
 PRESS – Redd Barna Ungdom (youth organisation of the Norwegian Save the 
Children organisation) 
 Norges Fredslag (Norwegian Peace Association) 
 Amnesty International Norway 
 Senior advisors at the MFA.  
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4.4. Validity 
According to George and Bennett (2005:19), qualitative case studies have the 
advantage of high conceptual validity, because they allow for conceptual refinements. 
Open-ended interview questions make it possible for the interviewees to formulate the 
answers in their own words, and thus concepts in different contexts can be compared. 
In addition, if data from different sources is triangulated to support a fact, conceptual 
validity is further strengthened because these sources provide different measures of the 
same phenomenon(Yin 2003:99).  
As presented in the section on the sampling method, the NGO employees and 
governmental officials interviewed are representative for the circle of civil society and 
state representatives who work on the issue of SALW. Since all NGO employees and 
governmental officials I contacted were willing to be interviewed, the problem of non-
response does not endanger the representativity in this case.  
Though, in terms of external validity, it is important to assess whether the findings of 
this study are relevant for the “Norwegian model” as a whole. Literature so far has 
mostly focused on state-NGO cooperation in the field of development and 
humanitarian aid, and the model originally referred to this subfield of foreign policy. 
However, since the actors are generally the employees of the same organisations and 
state departments, it is expected that the mechanisms and facilitating conditions for 
cooperation are similar across various policy areas.  
Nevertheless, according to Yin (2003:37), the aim of case studies is analytical 
generalisation, meaning that “the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set 
of results to some broader theory”. In this case, the findings about Norwegian state-
NGO cooperation in the field of SALW export control are expected to tell us 
something about governance arrangements in security policy in general, and thus 
contribute to the assessment of the relevance of Krahmann‟s theory on security 
governance. However, in order to judge the value of the theory for understanding 
contemporary security policy, further case studies are necessary. In sum, I still think 
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that the conclusions of this study can contribute to our knowledge about state-NGO 
cooperation in security policy and about the factors that facilitate the efficient 
functioning of the Norwegian model.   
4.5. Reliability 
In order to increase the reproducibility of my research, I used a semi-structured 
interview protocol to ensure the comparability of dimensions across the interviews, 
though the protocol was used with great flexibility to preserve the conversational 
nature of the interview. Furthermore, I used coding templates to make sure that all the 
dimensions are covered in each interview, to compensate for the analytical 
disadvantage of using open-ended questions (Berry 2002).  
I also documented the interviews in extensive transcriptions which are available upon 
request. The empirical findings of the case study are summarised in a chapter separate 
from the analysis itself, so that the “evidence” is presented in an unbiased way, making 
the logic of the conclusion more transparent and thus increasing the reliability of the 
case study significantly (Yin 2003:102).  
Furthermore, I sent the quotes that I used from the interviews to government officials 
and asked them whether the quotes are used and interpreted correctly according to 
them. The reason for only making this step in the case of state employees was that 
there were only two of them in the sample, and therefore it was more important to 
make sure that the quotes are correct, since they were the only sources from the 
government‟s side. In the case of NGO employees, they more or less mentioned the 
same concerns, expressed the same views and experiences, and thus the added value of 
double-checking was rather low compared to the time and effort it would have taken. 
Also, the use of method and data triangulation helps to minimise the biases and errors, 
and thus further strengthens the reliability of my analysis (Yin 2003:37).  
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Chapter 5 Interview Data 
In the following sections I will summarise the personal experiences, perspectives and 
attitudes of NGO employees, as well as governmental officials according to five major 
dimensions (see Table 5.1.).  
The first dimension covers the general functioning of the NGOs – how they finance 
their activities, the main sources of funding, the strategies they use and their 
participation in international advocacy networks. The question of whether they receive 
governmental funding and whether they see it as problematic is an important factor in 
assessing the degree of independence they managed to uphold, and helps to create a 
picture about the everyday settings these organisations work in. Furthermore, my 
intention with this dimension is to evaluate the relevance of two concepts presented in 
the theory chapter for the Norwegian case: Karp‟s standpoint about a “Faustian 
bargain” between NGOs and governments based on funding and consultations in the 
case of SALW (Karp 2006), and the adaptation mechanisms discussed by Trenz in the 
case of German civil society and funding provided by the EU (Trenz 2007). Findings 
about their strategies and links to international networks will be analysed in the light of 
the typology presented by Keck and Sikkink (1998:18-25). 
The second dimension includes the variables evolving around the issue of SALW 
export regulation in general – international practices, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the human rights, humanitarian and development approach, and 
experiences gained from and similarities with the landmine and cluster ammunition 
campaigns. The latter is important because it is widely debated whether the SALW 
issue is comparable with these two previous campaigns, by placing them under the 
umbrella of humanitarian disarmament (see Rutherford 2000; O'Dwyer 2006). 
Moreover, the MFA has recently assigned the small arms portfolio to the same section 
that was responsible for the landmine and cluster ammunition campaigns, and thus this 
variable provides valuable insight about how civil society sees the link between these 
processes.  
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Furthermore, with including variables concerning the perceived problems and 
deficiencies of international practices, my intention was to get a picture of what the 
NGOs see as the most important issues that need to be addressed, in terms of both 
existing and future regulations.  
The views and experiences of NGO employees concerning the discussion of SALW as 
a humanitarian and development issue instead of a security issue are of high 
significance, given that in the presentation of her security governance theory 
Krahmann identifies the proliferation of SALW first and foremost as a security threat, 
placing it in the realm of security policy (Krahmann 2005a:6). Furthermore, the 
process leading to the EU CoC regulating the export of SALW is presented as an 
example of NGO influence in security policy (Anders 2005), and thus it is a key 
concern whether the issue of SALW indeed belongs to the realm of security policy. 
Therefore, findings about the framework within which the issue of SALW is discussed 
have important implications for the relevance of the security governance theory in the 
present security environment.  
The third dimension includes two variables: perceived problems concerning 
Norwegian SALW export regulations and practices, as well as issues where NGO 
interests and Norwegian strategic interests collide. The first variable serves the 
purpose of getting a picture of the Norwegian SALW landscape and identifying the 
central issues of NGO lobbyism, in order to have the necessary background 
information to understand NGO activism and consultations with the government. The 
latter variable gives important insights about the topics where the 
humanitarian/development approach represented by the NGOs and traditional state 
interests, such as security policy, party politics and economics seem to be 
incompatible. Apart from its relevance for the security governance theory, this variable 
also plays a key role in assessing whether NGOs were able to preserve their 
“watchdog” role and independent voice (Hendriks 2006; Karp 2006) by having a 
position different from that of the government‟s. 
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The fourth dimension covers the personal experiences and attitudes relating to the 
consultations with the government, including the openness and responsiveness of the 
state officials – how often are NGOs invited to the consultations, whether the 
consultations are regular or rather on an occasional basis, who took the initiative, 
examples of NGO success in changing certain policies, as well as the attitudes of 
government officials towards the inclusion of civil society in policy formulation and 
decision-making. Also, in order to discuss the “watchdog vs. partner” dilemma 
(Hendriks 2006; Karp 2006), it is important to include the position of NGO employees 
on participation in consultations with the government, as well as on being a member of 
national delegations at international conferences. Examples provided by the 
interviewees of success or “breakthrough” in the realm of SALW export regulations 
have an important role in assessing the extent of NGO impact concerning arms trade 
issues.  
As a fourth variable, I examined whether the NGO community cooperates before 
consultations to arrive at a common position, or they rather act as separate voices. The 
significance of this variable lies in the added information it can provide about the 
strategies of NGOs, as well as about whether they managed to preserve their 
independence not only from the government, but also from other NGOs or they had to 
give up some of their defining characteristics in order to have a stronger impact on 
government decisions by presenting a unified position.  
The fifth dimension encompasses the international setting, the legitimacy of Norway in 
the eye of other countries, the role of the EU and the EU CoC in increased export 
regulation of SALW and in the process towards an international ATT, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of Norwegian non-membership in the EU. Findings 
about Norway‟s international reputation as it is perceived by NGOs and the 
implications of non-membership in the EU help to identify the facilitating 
circumstances and characteristics of NGO-state cooperation. Furthermore, the views of 
NGO employees on the importance and legitimacy of the EU have significance for the 
possibility and viability of closer EU-civil society cooperation.  
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Although the presentation of the different dimensions will mainly focus on the answers 
given by NGO employees during the interviews, their views will be supplemented by 
those of governmental officials in order to arrive at a more nuanced picture of the 
relationship between civil society and the state.  
Table 5.1. The variables and the different dimensions they describe.  
Variables
3
 Dimension 
V1: Funding, functioning, strategies D1 
Resources for 
activism V2: International links 
V3: Human rights, humanitarian, development approach  
D2  
The Issue of SALW 
V4: General problems with SALW export regulation/practices 
V5: The landmine and cluster ammunition campaigns 
V6: Problems with Norwegian SALW export 
regulations/practices 
D3 
The SALW Issue in 
Norway V7: NGO goals vs. Norwegian strategic interests 
V8: NGOs as experts and consultants D4  
Relationship with the 
State: Openness, 
Responsiveness, 
Independence 
V9: Consultations vs. independence 
V10: Examples of success 
V11: Coordination before consultations 
V12: Norway‟s international reputation  D5  
The International 
Setting 
V13: The EU‟s role and reputation  
V14: Norwegian non-membership in the EU 
 
 
                                                          
3
 See the exact description of the different variables in Annex IV. 
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5.1. D1 Resources for activism 
V1 Funding 
Out of the seven NGOs included in the sample, only one had a strong policy of not to 
receive governmental funding at all, “because one of our main roles is to criticize 
governments, and we don‟t want to come into a situation where it could be stated that 
we receive money from a state and don‟t want to criticize them”4, as the interviewee 
put it. However, this organisational policy originates from the international umbrella 
organisation and was not a decision made by their Norwegian affiliate. That is not to 
say that the Norwegian organisation disagrees with this policy, but they see the 
possible disadvantages in terms of lost financial power, though according to their 
opinion, the political risks and dangers outweigh the possible gains, making this policy 
“a very correct choice” for their organisation.  
Concerning those organisations that receive governmental funding, there are usually 
two main sources of funding: the MFA and the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD). Financial assistance provided by the MFA is mostly on a 
project-to-project basis, similarly to the NORAD funding based on “Single 
agreements” (Enkeltavtale), which was administered by the MFA before 2004 
(NORAD 2009). Furthermore, NORAD also provides funding on the basis of 
„Framework agreements” (“Rammeavtale”) for three or four years, though it requires 
that the organisation applying for this kind of funding has cooperated with NORAD 
for several years. Similarly to the “single agreements”, the purpose of the framework 
agreements is to support nation-wide organisations in disseminating information about 
central North-South and development issues among the Norwegian population, and to 
help them in establishing links to and cooperation with civil society in the global South 
(NORAD 2009). Since 2001, NGOs only have to raise 10% of the budget on their 
own, though the MFA and NORAD often provide funding covering 100% of the 
expenses (Tvedt 2003:91-92).  
                                                          
4
 Interview 7 with an NGO employee, 30.03.2009. 
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Furthermore, depending on the issue, some of the NGOs receive funding from other 
departments, such as the Ministry of Health and Care Services, or the Ministry of 
Children and Equality in the case of youth organisations.  
Two potential problems associated with governmental funding could be mentioned: on 
the one hand, the project-to-project based funding could result in the agenda-setting 
role of the government; on the other hand, NGOs could lose their watchdog role and 
be less critical towards policies as a consequence of state funding, especially if it is 
only necessary to document that they can raise 10% of the budget by themselves.  
In terms of the first concern, the lack of continuity and the need to apply for funding 
based on project agreements has some backdrops according to the interviewees, since 
in this case NGOs are obviously  “aware of what kind of projects they would fund and 
what‟s that they are not interested in”5. However, the interviewee also added that if 
they would like to work on other issues than those prioritised by the government, they 
usually get funding from other sources.  
Furthermore, since there is an abundance of different governmental funds and the 
guidelines for what issues to support are rather vague and cover a wide range of topics 
within development policy (see above), NGOs can frame the issue that they want 
support for in a way that it fits a certain type of funding – as an interviewee put it: “we 
generally apply on what we want to work with, and then try to find an angle on the 
different types of funding you can apply for with that subject”6.   
An important point made by an interviewee working for an NGO with security policy 
focus was that apart from some occasional, project-based financial support, they are in 
a rather difficult financial situation compared to NGOs focusing on humanitarian and 
developmental issues. If they were to change their focus, though, they were told by the 
MFA that “it would be very easy to throw money on” them7.  
                                                          
5
 Interview 1 with an NGO employee, 20.03.2009. 
6
 Interview 10 with an NGO employee, 29.04.2009. 
7
 Interview 4 with an NGO employee, 25.03.2009. 
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However, those organisations active in the field of development policy can navigate 
quite freely in their efforts to receive financial support for their projects and long-term 
activities, though of course, there is always a possibility for improvement. As one of 
the NGO employees put it: “obviously it would be better to be given lots and lots of 
money every year and then just do what you want with it, and that would make my life 
easier, but you don‟t live in a perfect world, that doesn‟t happen”8.  
Funding vs. independence 
In 1962, when the Norwegian government first provided funding for NGOs, the 
requirement to be able to raise 50% of the budget was seen as a guarantee for 
preserved independence and links to the people they represent. However, in 1979 the 
necessary ratio was lowered to 20% and then to 10% in 2001, with the possibility to 
set the requirement aside in some cases, resulting in a 100% funding, while the debate 
around the link between independence and the requirement for own funds gradually 
faded away (Tvedt 2003:88-89;91). Nevertheless, it should also be mentioned that 
when NORAD funding guidelines were reviewed in 2003, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Norwegian parliament stressed that the independence and 
“watchdog” role of civil society should be preserved, and that it is important to have 
wide public debates concerning the different political choices in development and 
foreign policy (NORAD 2005).  
When asked about the second concern, those interviewees whose organisations receive 
funding did not give expression of a perceived loss of independence as a result of 
governmental funding and they do not feel like being controlled by the government 
concerning what to say: “we have never been under direct pressure to not to talk about 
some issues or drop the subject. We have always been able to basically say whatever 
we wanted”9. Another interviewee said that they “would never be asked to keep quiet 
or anything, it‟s more the other way”10: last year the government asked them to make a 
“stunt” for a certain topic, because the Ministry of Development wanted to have more 
                                                          
8
 Interview 1 with an NGO employee, 20.03.2009. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Interview 8 with an NGO employee, 02.04.2009. 
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attention and awareness around the issue, so they were in a way contracted by the 
state.  
However, one of the interviewees found it problematic that the financial support 
provided by the government presupposes that the views of the NGO are in accordance 
with the governmental position: “if (...) there was to be a new governmental funding 
being non-political in the sense that it would not be a funding for supporting 
Norwegian views on humanitarian issues and so on, then we would definitely say yes 
to that money (...), but that‟s not how it is these days”11. He also added that as an 
organisation dealing with radical concepts, they have to be very cautious about whom 
to accept money from.  
All in all, except for one organisation that is strongly against accepting governmental 
funding and one NGO that has some reservations about the political implications of it, 
the majority of the NGOs included in the sample receive regular and/or occasional 
financial support provided by different departments, but mainly by the MFA and 
NORAD. According to the interviewees, although the project-based system results in 
some insecurity and an increased focus on issues prioritised by the government, 
Norwegian NGOs are generally in a good and stable financial situation and manage to 
finance their activities by using multiple sources.  
V2 International links, strategies 
Concerning the lobby and/or campaigning activities of the NGOs included in the 
sample, there is a difference between organisations that are national initiatives and 
those that are local affiliates of international networks or advocacy groups. In the latter 
case, there is a division of labour between the umbrella organisation and the local 
NGOs – while the umbrella organisation is responsible for lobbying at the 
international level, the local groups lobby their national governments, although 
Norwegian NGO employees are often members of international steering committees or 
similar bodies. On the other hand, NGOs not originating from a big international 
                                                          
11
 Interview 4 with an NGO employee, 25.03.2009. 
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umbrella organisation are active at both levels, lobbying the national government as 
well as international institutions, such as the UN, the EU, etc.  
Youth organisations tend to concentrate on the national level, with campaigns in 
Norway and lobby activism oriented towards the Norwegian government and industry. 
When it comes to international issues, such as the negotiations evolving around the 
nascent ATT, they rather try to influence the Norwegian position than lobbying 
international organisations directly, although they also participate in networks.    
5.2. D2 The Issue of SALW 
V3 – The humanitarian approach vs. the security approach 
As mentioned above, there is only one Norwegian NGO that addresses the SALW 
issue within the framework of security policy. Although it is popular to talk about the 
securitisation of different issues in international politics, the discussion of SALW is 
rather characterised by an opposite trend: “what was initially quite a securitised thing, 
has been desecuritised in that the main focus, I would say, is now on development”12. 
According to the interviewee, this change in focus can be explained by two main 
reasons:  
1. The desecuritisation was a pragmatic move by the NGO community, given that 
it is easier to acquire financial support for activities related to development and 
humanitarian issues than to security policy.  Furthermore, as another 
interviewee pointed out, campaigning on development and humanitarian issues 
is easier and more powerful, because NGOs can use photos depicting human 
suffering taken in the field, “big posters of crying children or people in hospital, 
or people lacking a limb”, making the campaign “morally much more 
weighty”13. 
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2. Since small arms do not present a security problem for Western countries like 
Norway, it was a logical choice to discuss the negative effects of the 
proliferation of SALW in developing countries where it is a question of human 
security, making it relevant for the development and humanitarian policy of 
Western countries. Furthermore, in many countries it is easier to discuss a 
development problem than a security problem: “by taking away the security 
focus, it does sort of open up an area of discussion which would otherwise be 
closed”14. Another interviewee put it this way: „it‟s also a lot easier to be a 
spokesperson for the disabled and the victims, than it is being the spokesperson 
for other states that we‟re not friendly with”15. Moreover, the use if this 
framework helps to escape the „conflict paradigm”, as one interviewee pointed 
out, because it extends the narrow focus on war and armed violence to include 
internal oppression by militant groups and its implications for human security 
and development
16
.  
Apart from the advantages of using a humanitarian and development 
framework, the problematic and politically-laden character of the alternative 
terrorism debate also drives activists towards using the former framework 
instead of the latter one. „If you enter that approach (i.e. the terrorism 
approach), or if you enter that dialogue or discussion, then as a neutral, 
independent, humanitarian organisation we would have (...) great difficulties 
with not being trapped in some kind of arguments”17. Thus, most of the 
interviewees said that they would rather avoid linking the SALW issue to 
terrorism. Although they touch upon the concerns about the acquisition of 
weapons by non-state groups, they do that rather in the context of contributing 
to human rights violations and hampering development than terrorism. 
Generally, they do not want to enter the terrorism debate, because „it takes 
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focus away from what we believe is most important, not the people in the West, 
but people in developing countries”18.  
Although it is common for the NGOs included in the sample that they discuss the 
SALW issue from a humanitarian and development perspective, they address different 
aspects and tend to have a specialised mandate and expertise. While Amnesty 
International focuses on the human rights aspect, the Norwegian Red Cross has 
international humanitarian law as a starting point. The Norwegian Church Aid and 
Changemaker apply a South perspective, and PRESS – Redd Barna Ungdom focuses 
on children‟s rights.  
When asked about possible disadvantages of using human rights as a starting point, 
they mentioned that it could be problematic and difficult to assess what constitutes a 
human rights violation on the one hand, and that it does not address armed violence 
committed by non-state groups, on the other hand, because these groups are not 
subject to human rights law.   
A change in approach has also manifested itself in the organisational set-up of the 
MFA. Within the MFA, the small arms portfolio had previously been administered by 
the Section for Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Export Control, which is a part of 
the Department for Security Policy and the High North, but it was recently assigned to 
the Section for Humanitarian Affairs under the Department for UN, Peace and 
Humanitarian Affairs. The reason for this reorganisation was that within the MFA the 
small arms issue was also perceived of as “a humanitarian and a developmental 
problem, not a security policy issue, not a traditional disarmament or arms control 
issue”19, and the political leadership wanted to place it “under the same umbrella of 
humanitarian disarmament”20, which already included the successful cluster 
ammunition and landmine portfolios. According to the interviewee, the humanitarian 
approach gained popularity “because it delivered a result (in the case of the landmine 
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and cluster ammunition processes), and for politicians that‟s a very convincing 
argument”21, though civil society also had a crucial role in triggering a change.  
Nevertheless, it should also be mentioned that the NGO that in contrast to the other 
organisations included in the sample has a security policy focus still discusses the 
SALW issue in the framework of security. However, as demonstrated in the section 
about funding, the security approach is undoubtedly less successful than the 
humanitarian or development perspective, probably also as a result of the change in 
focus within the MFA.  
 
V4 – General problems with SALW export regulation 
When asked about the perceived problems of the current SALW export regulations, 
two recurring issues were mentioned.  
End-user certificates and control of re-export: In many instances, arms export is 
carried out without demanding an end-user certificate, and thus, although the weapons 
were probably sold to a responsible actor and to a country which is not at war and does 
not violate international humanitarian law or human rights, the weapons can be re-
exported without the producing/exporting state being aware of the transfer. Even in 
states with a rather strict export control regime, such as NATO countries, it is common 
practice that in the case of weapon transfers within the Alliance an end-user certificate 
is not demanded. On the other hand, even if the end-user certificate is a requirement 
for arms export, there are no follow-up mechanisms in place. Still, even if there are 
good monitoring practices implemented, the criteria used to assess whether an arms 
transfer to a certain actor should take place are often questionable. One of the 
interviewees mentioned the United States as an example of a state that has strong 
enforcement mechanisms on end-user controls, although the criteria they use are 
                                                          
21
 Interview 6 with a state employee, 27.03.2009. 
 60 
 
widely debated – “they can sell weapons to actors that violate human rights, but at 
least they know they did, and they know where the weapons ended up”22.  
A further problem associated with end-user agreements originates from the globalised 
character of arms production – more and more frequently, different parts and 
components of weapons are produced in several countries spread around the world, 
and thus it is problematic to decide which country is the final producer that should ask 
for an end-user agreement. This problematique is also linked to the second group of 
issues concerning the current SALW export regulations, namely the lack of universal 
standards – in order to efficiently regulate the global trade and production of SALW, a 
“a globally enforced control regime”23  is essential.  
This non-regulated character of arms trade has far-reaching consequences – as one of 
the interviewees pointed out, “a lot of weapons have a very legitimate first transfer”24, 
but as a result of uncontrolled re-export they often end up in the black market. Thus, 
the need for demanding an end-user certificate from all customers, even within 
military alliances, and putting in place monitoring mechanisms to actually control 
these agreements, are identified as major problems by NGO employees, contributing 
to armed violence around the world by enabling access to weapons for actors that 
otherwise could not acquire them. A point made by one of the interviewees sums up 
the concerns: “It‟s very difficult to go back one step when an arms transfer has been 
made, so it‟s very difficult to prosecute deliveries of arms to perpetrators of 
international humanitarian law, perpetrators of genocide, etc”.25   
 
Lack of universal standards and the need for a comprehensive treaty: Although there 
are many examples of successful regional export control regimes, such as the EU CoC, 
the Nairobi Protocol or the ECOWAS Convention, “there‟s no communication 
between the different regional regimes”, and they regulate different things with a 
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different language, based on different criteria and demands for implementation
26
. 
Another interviewee also identified the fact that “there are no universally accepted 
criteria for arms transfers” as a major problem27.  
The need for an international ATT to harmonise the different regional and weapon-
type specific agreements was also stressed by another NGO employee and that 
“getting an agreement that covers everything from handguns to military helicopters is 
important”28. Furthermore, he stressed that it is crucial that besides various types of 
weapons, also components, parts, expertise and licenses are included in a future ATT. 
The same interviewee also pointed out that “there are limited regulations concerning 
the human rights aspect and the international humanitarian law aspect”29, and that it 
should be clear in a future international arms trade agreement that it is a decisive factor 
when issuing export licenses what the arms are going to be used for. However, he 
added that the inclusion of these aspects makes a potential treaty more comprehensive 
and in a way more problematic – while it is rather unproblematic to determine whether 
there is a war in a country, it is difficult to universally agree on what constitutes a 
human rights violation and where the limits are.  
 
V5 – The landmine and cluster ammunition campaigns  
Since the landmine and the cluster ammunition campaigns are the best examples to 
demonstrate how successful NGOs can be in influencing states all over the world, it is 
a logical step from the NGO community to make attempts to treat the process towards 
the ATT as a continuation of the previous campaigns. As one of the interviewees put 
it: “You saw the fantastic success of the landmine, everything that happened there, 
everything that started out as some, quite a few called a naïve campaign, and ended up 
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in a very strict prohibition on all landmines”30. However, another interviewee argued 
that although there are several NGOs that try to make a connection between these 
campaigns, it is “not a very wise thing to do, because both the theme, the strategic 
relevance and the legal process are as different as it can be”, and therefore to compare 
these processes is “a very wrong way of thinking”31, while another interviewee meant 
that these processes are “not comparable at all”32.  
Among the reasons for the different character of the ATT process, the interviewees 
mentioned the complicated nature of regulating trade in small arms which is “deemed 
by all states in the world to be legitimate and legal”33. Therefore, as argued by another 
interviewee, “the Control Arms campaign had to be more complicated and detailed” 
compared to the landmines and cluster ammunition campaigns that were simply 
seeking to ban something that was seen as “morally unacceptable” by most states and 
did not serve “any significant military purpose”34.  
In contrast to banning certain types of arms, the ATT has the aim of establishing a 
“complex set of regulatory measures to ensure that arms exports and arms transfers are 
carried out as responsibly as possible” which again makes the issue complicated. Thus, 
the campaign “had to spend a lot of resources on basically getting experts and lawyers 
to develop that argument”. Furthermore, the campaign itself has different 
characteristics, because it is considerably more difficult to campaign on a set of 
regulations than on banning something
35
.  
Also, there is a major difference between the landmines and cluster ammunition issue 
on the one hand, and SALW on the other hand concerning their thematic reach, 
because the concept of SALW covers a “wide range of weapons”36 and is not limited 
to one type of weapon.  
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A further point made by one of the interviewees was that “landmines and cluster 
ammunitions by their nature cannot distinguish between a civilian and a combatant” 
and that distinction is a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law
37
. On 
the other hand, small arms “are fired by a person, and it‟s the person who distinguishes 
between targets”, which again makes the issue of regulating small arms complex.   
As another distinguishing factor an interviewee mentioned the character of the process 
itself: while the landmine and cluster ammunitions campaigns were processes outside 
the UN, the ATT is a UN process that requires consensus and can be stopped by the 
powerful countries using their veto right
38
. According to the interviewee, this makes 
the government officials at the MFA who previously worked on the successful 
processes outside the UN sceptical towards the ATT process. This assumed scepticism 
was corroborated by one of the government officials: “now we will have like 3 years 
of work, and we already decided to waste one year, by deciding that this year should 
only be general exchange of views, and with a report that has to be done by consensus 
to the Secretary General. And if you have the set-up you have in the room, what are 
you going to get consensus about? You‟re going to get consensus about we met, we‟ve 
discussed”. The interviewee also added that “if the ATT is going to deliver as little as I 
fear, then maybe it‟s a waste of time”39.  
When it comes to the experiences gained and lessons learned from the landmine and 
cluster ammunition processes, the significant role that civil society can play is 
definitely a central point. Both a government official and an NGO employee 
mentioned the importance of bringing the “field perspective”40 and “the realities from 
the ground”41 to disarmament processes that traditionally have a “closed room 
approach”, often leading to failure42.  
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These two processes also showed that the international community “will not get a 
treaty that covers so much and so focused as these two treaties without the NGOs”43. 
This significant role of civil society in these processes was also acknowledged by one 
of the government officials, who emphasised that “if you leave states too much to 
themselves, in places like Geneva with a bunch of diplomats with polished shoes, 
you‟re not coming at anything”44.  
Furthermore, it was mentioned by NGO employees that these processes showed that 
coordination among themselves is essential in achieving their goals, and that the 
Norwegian government is open to cooperation with civil society, although according 
to one of the NGO employees, this openness depends on the implications of the issue, 
for instance the impact it has on arms trade with other countries in the case of 
regulating arms exports
45
.  
 
5.3. D3 The SALW Issue in Norway 
V6 – Problems with Norwegian SALW export regulations/practices 
V7 – NGO goals vs. Norwegian strategic interests 
With regards to problems associated with Norwegian SALW export practices and 
regulations, most of the interviewees stressed that in general, Norway has rather good 
mechanisms for regulating arms trade and taking into consideration human rights and 
humanitarian aspects when deciding about issuing export licenses. However, they see 
many possibilities for improvement: “we don‟t think that the Norwegian export regime 
is strict enough, but it is the best in the world, but the Norwegian regime has to be 
better”46. Furthermore, although they assign a high value to a future ATT, its 
implications for Norway are minimal given that Norwegian regulations are already 
stricter than an international agreement will be. Thus, many of them would like 
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Norway to set an example for other countries: “we want Norway to be a forerunner 
and like a best practice country”47.  
Concerning potential improvements, the answers evolved around three main topics: 
end-user certificate, transparency and state ownership in arms producing companies.  
 
End-user certificate: All of the NGO employees included in the sample identified it as 
a major problem that Norway does not demand end-user certificates from NATO and 
Nordic countries – “when it comes to your allies, they say that it‟s sort of practice that 
you don‟t use it”48. The problem with this practice is that there are several documented 
cases of re-export from NATO countries to destinations where Norway would not 
export to, based on the export guidelines
49
.  
One of the interviewees mentioned that they are often confronted by the government 
saying that if NGOs think that Norwegian weapons end up in places where they should 
not, then the NGOs must prove it. However, the interviewee argued that it is the 
government that should know and prove where the arms are, even after they have been 
exported, “because selling weapons is not like selling rice”, and “right now, they‟ve 
got zero control over Norwegian weapon exports” 50. According to another NGO 
employee, the state secretary at the Ministry of Trade said in an interview that “that‟s a 
dilemma: when you choose to be a weapon exporter, then you can‟t know where your 
weapon is ending up”51, upon which the NGO came with specific recommendations 
about how to trace the journey of Norwegian weapons so that they know where they 
are ending up.  
When asked about possible reasons for not demanding an end-user certificate from 
NATO and Nordic countries, the main reasons identified by the interviewees were 
alliance politics and the protection of the arms industry. One of the interviewees 
                                                          
47
 Interview 9 with an NGO employee, 03.04.2009. 
48
 Interview 7 with an NGO employee, 30.03.2009. 
49
 Interview 4 with an NGO employee, 25.03.2009. 
50
 Interview 10 with an NGO employee, 29.04.2009. 
51
 Interview 8 with an NGO employee, 02.04.2009. 
 66 
 
mentioned that they were told by the MFA that “the first principle in an alliance like 
NATO is to trust each other, and then we can‟t ask them where you‟re selling 
Norwegian weapons to” and that the MFA tends to compare this to the trust in mutual 
defence in case of an attack
52
.  
The government‟s concerns identified by NGO employees about having a good 
relationship with allied countries were corroborated by the reasons given by one of the 
government officials. The interviewee said that “it is actually a political decision” and 
“a security and foreign policy issue who we sell military equipment to”53. In terms of 
re-export from NATO countries and the participation of NATO countries in war-like 
activities (e.g. the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), which is heavily 
criticised by NGOs, the interviewee argued that “when we sell to an allied country 
(...), we don‟t put any geographical limitations on where they can use their own 
materiel” and this is “part of a bigger security and foreign policy issue again”54.  
On the other hand, NGO employees also mentioned the protection of the Norwegian 
arms industry as a potential reason for not demanding end-user certificates – according 
to them, the government is afraid that if they put restrictions on the exported arms 
concerning re-export, they would lose customers
55
. As a specific example an NGO 
employee mentioned that with the US being the best customer of Norway, demanding 
an end-user declaration from them could be problematic, both from the industrial and 
the alliance politics aspect
56. Furthermore, another interviewee argued that “we 
(Norway) are exporting as much as we do because many countries are selling the 
ammunition further” and a decrease in weapon exports would lead to the loss of jobs 
in Norway
57
. As she pointed out, with the Labour Party saying that they want to 
protect jobs, this would have significant political consequences with elections coming 
up in September 2009.  
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Transparency: Lack of transparency and difficulties concerning access to information 
were also recurring themes when asked about problems with the Norwegian SALW 
export regulations and practices. Although transparency has improved a lot over the 
years and Norway is a forerunner compared to many other states, the government 
could certainly follow the example of best practice countries and provide more 
information
58
.  
As pointed out by one of the government officials, this improvement concerning 
transparency was a result of both the EU CoC and a high-level political decision by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Norway, leading to the department and the section 
making efforts to be as transparent as possible
59
.  
Nevertheless, one of the NGO employees found it generally problematic to get 
information about Norwegian arms exports, because the annual report published by the 
Section for Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Export Control about weapon 
transfers is too general and too broad, making it difficult to find the exact information 
one is looking for. Furthermore, since the report is published every year around June, 
the time lag between transfers that took place for example in January and are published 
in June next year is too big: “so often we don‟t get the numbers to work with, and then 
it‟s too late to do something about it”60.  
A further issue concerning transparency was mentioned by another interviewee – 
besides transparency about Norwegian arms trade in general, they demanded 
transparency in terms of the Nammo Group, a company with state shares amounting to 
50% and a major actor in the arms industry with worldwide reach. The NGO finds it 
necessary to have access to Nammo‟s marking system, since the company has a 
marking system in place but it is not possible for NGOs to access these databases 
containing information about where the weapons were sold to and whether they were 
re-exported
61
. According to the interviewee, the lack of transparency concerning 
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Nammo‟s activities is problematic, because “we don‟t know that Nammo in Finland is 
exporting to Saudi Arabia, but we know that Finland is exporting to Saudi Arabia”, 
and thus it could very much be the case that Nammo has exported to Saudi Arabia, 
where Norway would not export weapons to. Similarly, “Germany for a long time, at 
the latest in 2007, exported weapon and ammunition to Congo, and we don‟t know if 
that was Norwegian weapons but it could have been”62.  
State ownership: The Norwegian state‟s ownership in arms producing companies such 
as the Kongsberg Group and the Nammo Group was also frequently mentioned by the 
interviewees, especially in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In 
January 2009, the MFA published a White Paper discussing CSR, saying that central 
to the concept is the responsibility that corporations should take for the people, the 
society and the environment that their activities affect (MFA 2009a:7). Concerning 
state-owned companies, the document says that these corporations should play a 
leading role in showing social responsibility. Furthermore, it stresses that if the state 
does not enforce the high CSR standards through its ownership, then it could weaken 
the legitimacy of the state as a legislator or in foreign policy issues (ibid: 16). Based 
on this White Paper, Norwegian civil society demanded “the same rules for Nammo 
producers in all countries” and “the same system and transparency” concerning 
marking and tracing of ammunitions in Norway and Germany, as well as that the 
government should explicitly state “that Nammo in the US has to follow the same 
strict rules as in Norway”63 seem to be logical requests by the Norwegian civil society. 
Thus, the answer they got, according to the interviewee, from the state secretary at the 
MiTI regarding Nammo‟s overseas business activities came as a surprise: “I don‟t 
believe in enforcing better rules for companies in other countries (...), all producers 
have to follow the regimes of the country they are in”64. 
The issue of state ownership was also emphasised by another interviewee: “the 
Norwegian government should use their ownership or their shares in small arms and 
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ammunition producing companies to try to enforce some kind of marking practices 
from all state-owned companies”65. The interviewee‟s organisation tried to lobby the 
MiTI to make Nammo publish an ethical Code of Conduct with all Nammo-owned 
companies subjected to it. Although Nammo finally published a Code of Conduct, the 
interviewee said that “the final Code of Conduct wasn‟t at all what we wanted, of 
course, but they just said that any production or export will be in line with the national 
government regulation in each country we‟re producing in”66. Indeed, the Code of 
Business Conduct on Nammo‟s website states that “Nammo shall comply with the 
laws and regulations of the export regime of the respective countries from which 
Nammo exports its products and services” (Nammo 2008:5). This is very much in line 
with the statement made by the state secretary at the MiTI, quoted by the NGO 
employee above. However, the interviewee also added that it might not be popular to 
enforce the same regulations for licensed production and for Nammo companies in 
other countries, such as in the US,  which could explain the position of the 
aforementioned state secretary.  
Furthermore, one of the interviewees pointed out that the government often states that 
Norway is not a small arms exporting country, because they use definitions that do not 
include ammunitions in the category of SALW, such as the UN Firearms Protocol
67
. 
Indeed, one of the government officials found it important to stress several times that 
“we are not a producer of military small arms, we don‟t export military small arms” 
and used phrases like “if we should export arms, it‟s a hypothetical question, but if we 
were to export small arms”68 to emphasise that Norway is not exporting small arms. 
The NGO employee found this practice problematic, because “the small arms issue is 
not an issue if you don‟t have ammunition (...), you can stop wars by cutting 
ammunition flows”, and he argued that the government is covering up the issue by 
using the narrow definition of SALW
69
.  
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5.4. D4 Consultations 
V8 NGOs as experts and consultants 
According to the majority of the interviewees, both from the NGO and the state side, 
the consultations came about as a result of a natural process. Actors from both sides 
exchanged e-mails and shared their views on different topics with ongoing 
communication at a less intense level. As one of the interviewees pointed out, “the 
good thing about the Norwegian system is that the barriers between the government 
and organisations are not that high and we‟re listened to”70. These consultations 
generally have an ad hoc character – the most typical occasions are international 
conferences, white papers presented to the parliament, the publication of government 
reports, etc. Although these meetings are not regular in the sense that they are not 
scheduled for certain dates in every month, the government has “a very open door 
towards the NGOs”71, and thus meetings are organised if there is a demand from either 
the state or the civil society side: “They invite us when they feel they need some input, 
and we invite ourselves when we feel that we need to provide that input”72  
In terms of the usefulness of these consultations, several interviewees see them as a 
“one-way dialogue”73, and one of them even argued that “when you have your NGO-
hat on and you‟re making recommendations, then most of the time the governments 
ignore you, that‟s how life is“74. Still, the majority of the interviewees assign a high 
value to the consultations and presenting their views to the government: “if we don‟t 
share our perspectives and our knowledge, we‟re kind of pointless”75. Or as another 
interviewee put it: “having those kinds of consultative arenas is very important for us, 
as well as for the government, because good policy is not made in a vacuum”76. 
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Indeed, one of the government officials emphasised concerning consultations that “it‟s 
not like we‟re here in a vacuum, so it‟s an important interaction”77.  
Furthermore, an interesting point was made by another government official regarding 
the importance of NGOs expressing radical views and going further in their position 
than the Norwegian government, thus providing a wider negotiation room for the 
government: “most diplomats in their head have the idea that a good outcome is a 
compromise, it‟s sort of the middle ground where you really should be in the end, but 
the middle is somewhere between two extremes, and we need to have that room wide 
enough to get sufficient movement”78. The interviewee also highlighted the crucial 
role of civil society in the landmine and cluster ammunition processes, and that 
cooperation between the state and the NGOs is essential because very often certain 
forums are not willing to include the civil society‟s perspective and facts. Thus, the 
Norwegian government plays a major role by insisting on including civil society in 
negotiations and providing the room for them to present these facts
79
. 
At the consultations, NGOs mostly function as informants providing background 
information, as external consultants and informal advisors. As it was pointed out by 
one of the interviewees, they are often invited to share their opinions on specific issues 
when the government is entering a dialogue with national and/or international actors, 
and the NGO opinion will often be a part of the official views
80
.  Indeed, the demand 
from the government‟s side to have the civil society help to form their position was 
corroborated by the state employees included in the sample. The contributions made 
by civil society were perceived as valuable, although one of the government officials 
stressed that the NGO community should not be seen as one, because they all have 
different characteristics that are useful in different situations and topics. As the 
interviewee put it: “I‟ll sort of go shopping, I‟ll find who do I think will be able to 
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move things forward and actively deliver something, bring something to the table, and 
they will be my favourite partner”81.  
Both this government official and one of the NGO employees mentioned a meeting 
that took place before a UN conference – however, interestingly enough, both of them 
complained about the other not having a clear and well-formed position, and both sides 
seemed to expect to get help from the other side in forming their standpoints.  
 
V9 Consultations vs. independence 
In terms of the “watchdog vs. partner” dilemma, none of the NGO employees included 
in the sample found it problematic to participate in consultations with the government. 
As one of the interviewees put it: “being in a dialogue, a close dialogue, would not 
undermine that independence, as long as it is respected by both parties”82. Another 
interviewee argued that “though we are very close to the government, yes, absolutely, 
we are not bought up by the government”83. Furthermore, the consultations are seen as 
important and necessary arenas for interaction with the government, since in order to 
make attempts to change the government‟s position, they need to have contact84. A 
statement made by another interviewee sums up the NGO standpoint quite accurately: 
“we‟re activists and we work towards one goal, which is better control of arms trade in 
the world, we‟re not going to be government dolls because of that (i.e. the 
consultations), we still have our points and things that are important to us, and we‟re 
not going to let them go, at least not that easily”85. 
Nevertheless, numerous interviewees emphasised that whether participation in 
consultations is perceived as problematic depends on the government in question and 
the actors involved in the consultations. Trust and positive experience was mentioned 
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frequently: “we need to trust the government and the government needs to trust us”86; 
“if I didn‟t trust the people who were in that position to do that (i.e. abuse the 
situation) at those places, I would be very afraid”87. Furthermore, the interviewee 
stressed the importance of having clear roles and an NGO leadership with strong 
legitimacy and backbone to avoid getting into a “soft relationship” with actors that an 
NGO should not have a soft relationship with.  
When asked about whether they are afraid of being used by the government to 
legitimise the official position, none of the interviewees expressed fear, although one 
of the NGO employees said that the government would certainly try to do that 
sometime in the future. Apart from this interviewee, the NGO position can be summed 
up by the following quote: “we would never accept to be taken into account for 
standpoints that we don‟t have – this is from my experience with the Norwegian 
government, but they would never come with positions that question our independence 
from the government, either”88. Another interviewee argued that NGOs are often 
useful for the government in that they can say things that the government cannot, but 
she stressed that in many instances the NGOs use the government, as well
89
. Thus, the 
consultations have the characteristics of a relationship that is mutually beneficial. As 
one of the government officials put it: “to make the meetings valuable you have to see 
that ok, we can work together, not being the same, it‟s important to have a clear idea 
and understanding of the different roles, but to see that this is a valuable 
partnership”90.  
However, being a member of the national delegation at international conferences was 
perceived as more problematic than participation in consultations. Two organisations 
had a clear policy about not being a member of national delegations, but both of them 
mentioned that this policy could be difficult to pursue by smaller NGOs without 
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ECOSOC accreditation
91
. The reason for this decision lies in the various dangers 
associated with being a member of the delegation: “there is always a threat that you 
could be used, saying well, but they were a member of our delegation, they had the 
possibility to speak, so you would more or less be a hostage or you could be a 
hostage”92. Also, by standing outside, these NGOs have the freedom to express and 
support views that are not necessarily in accordance with Norwegian policies
93
.  
Both the above mentioned two NGOs and interviewees that do not see any problem 
with being a member of national delegation emphasised that the national settings are 
decisive factors concerning the implications of this kind of cooperation. As one of the 
interviewees who has been a member of the Norwegian delegation argued: “my 
experience is that it‟s not a problem with the Norwegian MFA, they kind of know who 
you are, and I think they appreciate really the independence of the civil society, NGOs 
and the researchers(...) and you‟re never obliged to support any policy”94. Another 
interviewee representing an organisation that chose the stand outside acknowledged 
that there is a “fantastic understanding from the government of the position of the 
NGOs and they don‟t abuse their position”, but he also stressed that the situation can 
be very different in other countries - “so, it‟s about sending a signal to the rest of the 
world, as well”95.   
Those interviewees that did not oppose being a member of the national delegation 
chose to do so because of pragmatic reasons – getting accreditation through the 
Norwegian delegation is the easiest way to gain access to the negotiations.  
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V10 Examples of success 
When asked about whether they could name some cases where the government 
changed some policies as a result of NGO influence, none of the interviewees reported 
a breakthrough or a radical change in the governmental position. However, most of 
them felt that they had “small victories”96 and that civil society has certainly affected 
the MFA positions to an extent, but not in the form of a radical change
97
. Two 
examples of rather clear success were mentioned: in 1993, one of the NGOs were told 
by the Norwegian MFA that “well, that is just naive to believe that there‟s going to be 
a ban” on landmines, but two years later the Norwegian government was working 
towards a ban with the support of the parliament
98
. Similarly, another interviewee 
mentioned that Norway engaged in the ATT process as a result of civil society 
pressure, although he also added that it is difficult to determine whether it was their 
contributions or the UK government that made the impact
99
. However, the changed 
international settings could also have accounted for the policy change in the first 
example.  
In terms of the small victories, improved transparency and increased awareness were 
identified by both the government and the NGO side. Furthermore, several 
interviewees pointed out that an “NGO language” is more and more frequently 
appearing in government documents. As a specific example, one of the interviewees 
mentioned that they started to use the term “krigsmateriell” (war materiel) instead of 
“other strategic goods” to make it clear that these products “enhance other foreign 
states‟ military ability and strategic relevance, and strategic balance” – interestingly 
enough, he said, the government recently started to use this term in official documents, 
which can be a sign of NGO impact
100
. As the interviewee pointed out, “these are 
battles of words, but those words are very important, extremely important”.   
                                                          
96
 Interview 9 with an NGO employee, 03.04.2009. 
97
 Interview 2 with an NGO employee, 24.03.2009. 
98
 Interview 3 with an NGO employee, 25.03.2009. 
99
 Interview 7 with an NGO employee, 30.03.2009. 
100
 Interview 4 with an NGO employee, 25.03.2009. 
 76 
 
Furthermore, another NGO employee named the inclusion of democratic criteria in the 
export guidelines as a small victory, as well as the publication of an Ethical Code of 
Conduct by Nammo. Although the latter was not at all what they wanted (see p.69.) it 
was obvious that the company formulated the Code of Conduct in reply to the NGO 
inquiries – “it‟s not a big thing, but it‟s a sign of influence, at least”101. Also, since the 
CoC has been published, the NGOs have a document they can refer to when 
highlighting the problems associated with the practice of state-owned companies.  
V11 Coordination before consultations 
None of the interviewees found it necessary to cooperate before consultations and 
harmonise their views on a certain topic. One of the interviewees mentioned that they 
often discuss their positions on an ad hoc and informal basis, and they tend to agree 
“about the substantive issues”102. However, several interviewees mentioned that it 
would take too much time and effort to arrive at a common position, and that probably 
they would agree on identifying the most important issues, but not on the ranking of 
these issues
103. Furthermore, many of them emphasised that “the more individual 
voices there is, the better, the stronger it is” and that “each organisation has a mandate, 
and each organisation has their focus area”104. Also, they often work at different levels 
and focus on the areas that they are best at, which are different things
105
. One of the 
interviewees also found it important to uphold an independent stand from other NGOs 
and publishing their views even if other NGOs will criticise them, and was strongly 
against harmonising NGO views
106
.  
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5.5. D5 The International Setting 
V12 Norway’s international reputation 
As it was pointed out by one of the interviewees, “Norway‟s got a fair legitimacy after 
their involvement both with the landmine convention and clusters convention, and also 
just because of their reputation in the world”107. The good reputation was also 
emphasised by the government officials included in the sample: “we are very popular 
in the sense that we can give some credibility and it‟s good to feel that there‟s interest 
in our views”108. “I think we have, for several reasons, had quite a good, very strong 
legitimacy and standing on these issues”, not only because of the role that Norway has 
played over the years as a peace promoter, but also because they “show it in real 
policy” in the case of arms exports, as well109.   
However, these positions expressed by government officials are in contrast with the 
views of NGO employees in general, especially in the context of Norway being a 
peace nation and arms producer at the same time. As one of the interviewees summed 
it up: “there‟s a dilemma between being an arms producing country, one of the world‟s 
largest arms producing countries, and also being very focused on development and 
human rights and peace, without being able to guarantee that the weapons that we 
produce aren‟t used contrary to development, human rights, humanitarian law”110. 
Another NGO employee emphasised that Norway‟s legitimacy is questioned if the 
government cannot know for sure whether Norwegian ammunition is killing civilians 
in the same countries where they promote peace, and if they do not address this 
problem by making necessary changes to the export regime
111
. This contradiction 
between the peace nation rhetoric and activism on the one hand, and Norwegian arms 
trade practices (e.g. the lack of end-user agreements in many cases, as well as marking 
and tracing) on the other hand, was identified as a key problem by the majority of the 
interviewees.  
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Nevertheless, some of the interviewees not only emphasised the above mentioned 
contradiction as something that needs to be addressed in order to preserve Norway‟s 
legitimacy and reputation, but they questioned the legitimacy itself. According to one 
of the interviewees, Norway is seen as “just another Western country”112 by the global 
South, while another NGO employee put it this way: “I don‟t think they look at 
Norway with any other eyes than they look at Saudi Arabia or Russia”113. Furthermore, 
it was also pointed out by an interviewee that peace promotion is rarely non-political 
and that he “would be surprised if someone claimed that Norway was always seen as 
neutral by all parties in the world”114. Thus, according to the interviewees, the 
international legitimacy and reputation of Norway is both endangered by the fact that 
Norway is a leading arms producer, and stands on weak grounds.  
 
V13 The EU’s role and reputation 
When it comes to the role that the EU plays in regulating small arms exports and the 
impact of the EU CoC, the majority of the interviewees has a positive view about the 
European efforts. Several interviewees mentioned that the EU CoC plays an important 
role in the process aiming for an international ATT because it has “given momentum 
to the process”115, and that the ATT can draw from the CoC because it is an efficient 
regime that has “gone fairly far in implementing human rights, humanitarian law” and 
other important aspects
116
. Although according to one of the government officials, 
even after the EU CoC has become legally binding, arms export is still seen as a 
political decision that each government can take “according to their own security 
interests or foreign policy issues”117, in most EU countries, the CoC “has created a lot 
of critical debate on who they sell arms to and why they cannot use the export criteria 
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as others”118. As pointed out by the same government official, the EU CoC has 
contributed to increased transparency and awareness in Norway, as well as to 
“building high international standards”119. Furthermore, the CoC has a strong 
normative effect, which “actually translates into national export control regulations 
over time”120.  
On the other hand, one of the government officials argued that “the ATT and other 
processes would benefit from more unusual constellations of states”, and cross-
regional cooperation, as well as avoiding the traditional blocks and usual dividing lines 
could make the process more efficient
121
. Furthermore, usually the EU member states 
have various and often contrasting views on the different topics, and therefore “they 
can only go so far as sort of the lowest standard in their joint statements”.  
Nevertheless, as one of the interviewees pointed out, experience has shown that it is 
almost impossible to “get an agreement without the EU on board”122.  
 
V14 Norwegian non-membership in the EU 
Although most of the interviewees see it as an advantage concerning the small arms 
issue that Norway is not a member of the EU, some of them mentioned the 
disadvantage of making less impact, as well. As one of the NGO employees put it, “it 
must be more powerful when the EU is presenting something than when little Norway 
is doing that”123, which was corroborated by a government official saying that “the 
weight of the EU would be usually a bit heavier than the one of Norway”124.  
Concerning the advantages, flexibility was a recurring theme – besides other 
interviewees emphasising the possibility of being more radical, one of the interviewees 
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stressed “the option to talk with other states and create alliances with other states”, and 
the “option of growing outside your security arena”125. This flexibility was also 
highlighted by government officials: “sometimes we consider it important just to stand 
together with others, sometimes it‟s possible and more relevant to take a lead on 
certain issues, it depends. But we are not a member, so we take that decision”126.  
An interesting aspect was mentioned by one of the interviewees, namely that Norway 
often represents the positions of EU members, mostly Sweden and Denmark, if they 
cannot get their message through in the EU and their standpoint would be more radical 
than the common position
127
. Furthermore, he pointed out that Norway as a non-
member can give legitimacy to the process, although it should be noted that it was the 
same interviewee who questioned that the international community would treat Saudi 
Arabia and Norway differently in terms of legitimacy: 
“I think that Norway as a sort of an outside country can also play a really important 
role, because for many the ATT process has been seen as a promotion of Britain‟s 
export control. And I think that a country like Norway can also bring other 
momentums into the agreement, and they can also play a part in including nations that 
you wouldn‟t really expect to be a part of it”128.  
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Chapter 6 Analysis 
6.1.  The Norwegian Model in Security Policy 
 
The analysis of the Norwegian model by Tvedt (2003) focuses on the close 
cooperation between the state and NGOs in the field of development policy and 
humanitarian aid. This policy area, characterised by the outsourcing of aid provision in 
the global South to private organisations, and the active participation of NGOs in 
policy formulation and implementation, is the perfect example of structures and 
processes that are best explained by the concept of “governance”. However, in the case 
of security policy the traditional strategic interests of the state are still regarded as the 
jurisdiction of executive prerogatives, and the prevalent secrecy and closed approach 
in decision-making raise the barriers of civil society participation significantly higher.  
 
In the following chapter I will assess the extent to which Norwegian NGOs were able 
to penetrate a certain field of security policy, the SALW issue, and whether the 
relationship between the state and civil society can most adequately be described by 
the concept of governance. As an organising framework I will use the seven 
dimensions described by Krahmann and presented in Chapter 1. These dimensions can 
take various forms on the scale between the ideal types of government and 
governance, i.e. centralisation and fragmentation, integration and differentiation. 
However, it is “difficult to specify which or how many dimensions have to be 
fragmented for a policy-making structure to qualify as „governance‟”, and different 
dimensions can often be characterised by countervailing trends (Krahmann 2003a). 
Still, the dimensions serve as a good basis for identifying a potential movement 
towards governance arrangements in security policy. 
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6.1.1. The Seven Dimensions 
 
Geography 
The first dimension concerns the geographical scope of policy making and 
implementation. In the case of the regulation of Norwegian SALW export, the only 
legally binding international agreement is the EU CoC, although before December 
2008 it was still only a Code of Conduct with  recommendations for participating 
states, being the prerogative of the individual state to decide whether to implement 
them or not. Besides this regional export regime, the international agreements 
concerning the export of SALW, such as the UN PoA, UN Firearms Protocol and the 
Geneva Declaration are the most relevant and significant for the Norwegian export 
regime. Furthermore, the nascent ATT has the aim of regulating the global arms trade 
with an international, legally binding agreement within the framework of the UN.  
Still, as it was pointed out by the majority of the interviewees, the Norwegian export 
regime is stricter than any of these international and regional regulations, and it is still 
up to the Norwegian export authority to decide whether and when to issue export 
licenses or not, although the incentives for compliance are strong and Norway usually 
acts in accordance with these regimes (see Policy implementation).  
 
All in all, the Norwegian export control regime is the product of different 
international, regional and national regulations, and thus it is geographically dispersed 
among different authorities at different levels.  
 
There is a further aspect of the SALW issue that is related to the geographical scope, 
namely the transnational nature of Norwegian arms production. The Nammo Group, 
which is a major actor in the field of ammunition production, has subsidiaries in 
Germany, Finland, Sweden and the United States, and has licensed production in 
various countries, such as Malaysia and Poland (Holm et al. 2006:55). Therefore, 
besides the fragmentation of political authority upwards to the regional and 
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international level, we can see the fragmentation of the arms industry sideways, in the 
form of increased transnationalisation (Krahmann 2003a).  
Function 
According to Krahmann, the broadening of the concept of security to “human 
security” did not lead to the integration of actors with different functions into a 
unifying authority. Rather, there occurred a differentiation within security policy and 
the traditional divisions of responsibility prevailed (Krahmann 2003a). The reason 
behind the preserved functions was that the concept became too broad to be handled 
with the limited expertise and resources of the different governments, and thus they 
decided to “buy” these competencies from private actors, such as private security 
companies and humanitarian organisations.  
 
Concerning Norwegian security policy and more specifically disarmament processes, 
the expertise of civil society regarding the situation on the ground was emphasised 
both by the government and the NGO side. However, representatives of the latter were 
rather focused on the importance of raising awareness by bringing the “field 
perspective” to the negotiation table129 and making a moral argument by using 
personal stories
130
, and thus it was a part of their tactics and strategies.  
 
On the other hand, one of the government officials stressed that the reason why the 
Oslo Process leading to the Convention on Ban of Cluster Ammunition was so 
successful is that the Norwegian leadership “managed to make it a facts-based 
process”. These crucial facts were provided by NGOs who know “the realities on the 
ground”131, and thus they were of paramount importance in providing the necessary 
expertise for the government, while the government provided the room for them to 
present these facts. In addition, NGOs play a crucial role in making the negotiation 
room wider for the Norwegian government. Furthermore, the depiction of the 
Norwegian NGO community by the interviewee implied a functional fragmentation 
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within civil society itself – according to this state employee, the different people at the 
different organisations all have their expertise in their own mandate, and thus they can 
fulfil different roles and can make valuable contributions according to their focus area, 
but they should not be regarded as one
132
.  
 
In a small country like Norway – and probably in bigger countries, too – the state 
apparatus would undoubtedly have great difficulties if they wanted to develop 
expertise concerning each and every issue at hand, and thus the division of labour and 
the functional differentiation between public and private actors comes as a necessity 
with the growing number of topics included under the umbrella of “human security”.  
 
However, although with the broadening of the security concept their areas of 
competency moved to the realm of security policy, the NGOs with a humanitarian and 
development focus explicitly stated that they want to preserve their focus. As one of 
the interviewees argued, “as a neutral, independent, humanitarian organisation” they 
“would have great difficulties in not being trapped in some kind of argument” if they 
entered the terrorism debate
133
, for instance, which is often presented as being linked 
to the SALW issue. Also, another interviewee mentioned that the terrorism approach 
“takes focus away from (...) people in developing countries”, and it is the global South 
that is the most important for their organisations
134
. Thus, there is a clear wish from the 
NGO community to uphold “the traditional divisions of responsibility” (Krahmann 
2003a:12). Furthermore, the functional fragmentation can also be observed within the 
NGO community itself, since each NGO has a special mandate and expertise, and the 
NGOs that are members of international umbrella organisations also have a division of 
labour according to the different levels of policy making and implementation that they 
lobby.  
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Distribution of resources 
As it was presented in the previous chapter, the Norwegian humanitarian and 
development organisations that are involved in the SALW issue almost exclusively 
finance their activities with governmental funding. Thus, the distribution of resources 
is still centralised, since the financial support they receive from other sources is 
insignificant.  
However, there are some privatisation trends that could be interpreted as a move 
towards governance arrangements in the Norwegian armament industry and that are 
relevant for the this dimension. In 1993, the Norwegian government sold part of its 
shares in Kongsberg Gruppen, and as a result state ownership was reduced to 50% 
from the previous 100% (NHD 2006:82). On the other hand, in 1998 the government 
bought the shares of Nammo Raufoss amounting to 45% in the Nammo Group, and in 
2005 a further 5% to increase state ownership to 50% (ibid.:84). Therefore, instead of 
a fragmentation in terms of resources, the Norwegian government has a clear policy of 
preserving state majority and thus its influence in the armament industry, in contrast to 
the privatisation trends in the Western European armament industries identified by 
Krahmann as one of the manifestations of security governance (Krahmann 2003a:13).  
 
Interests 
Concerning the interests that are represented in Norway in terms of the SALW issue, 
there is a rather stark contrast between state and NGO interests. As it was discussed in 
the previous chapter, traditional strategic interests such as alliance politics or the 
protection of the arms industry often stand in the way of implementing NGO 
recommendations, for instance demanding end-user certificates also in the case of 
NATO transfers or a more active and responsible state ownership. Furthermore, the 
NGO community itself is fragmented when it comes to interests – the organisations 
focus on various aspects of the SALW issue, ranging from human rights, international 
humanitarian law, children‟s rights and a South perspective to security policy. 
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Therefore, they all emphasised the necessity of having these different voices 
represented at consultations, and they were all against developing a common, unified 
NGO position.  
 
Norms 
In terms of the normative dimension it is important to mention two norms that 
established themselves in Norway in the last decades. First of all, there is wide 
consensus about making the country a “humanitarian superpower” which is expected 
to open doors in places where important decisions are made (Tvedt 2003:67). 
Although this norm is not directly relevant for initiating a move towards security 
governance, it has indirect implications in that the “Norwegian model” of close state-
NGO cooperation is seen as the first pillar in the pursuit of becoming a humanitarian 
superpower and as the ultimate tool for achieving altruistic goals (ibid.:56). This 
notion of a society-based foreign policy (Dobinson and Dale 2000:49) is the second 
established norm that has direct relevance for government vs. governance 
arrangements. The inclusion of civil society in various policy areas and topics is a 
strong underlying norm that has led to structures and processes that are best described 
by the concept of security governance.  
 
Decision-making 
According to Krahmann, the fragmentation of decision-making in security policy takes 
two forms: the establishment of issue networks and a move from decisions based on 
consensus towards weighted voting and similar mechanism (Krahmann 2003a:15).  
 
In terms of networks, in the Norwegian case both the government officials and the 
NGO employees described the formation of consultations as a natural process, and 
generally said that it is difficult to determine who took the initiative. The consultations 
originated from low level communication in the form of e-mails, phone calls and 
discussions during lunch, and have an ad hoc character – “they invite us when they 
feel that they need some input, and we invite ourselves when we feel that we need to 
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provide that input”135. Thus, the actors involved in the SALW issue in Norway form an 
issue-specific network consisting of private and public participants, with different 
constellations according to the issue at hand
136
. In addition, many of them participate 
in international networks such as IANSA (International Action Network on Small 
Arms) and ENAAT (European Network Against Arms Trade)
137
, as well.  
According to Krahmann, these “fragmented but overlapping networks which structure 
the collaboration among the growing range of public and private security actors” play 
a central part in security governance and are a significant characteristic of such 
arrangements in security policy (Krahmann 2003a:7).  
 
The second form that the trend towards governance can take is decision-making based 
on weighted voting or consensus minus one procedures instead of the requirement for 
consensus (ibid.:18). In terms of the SALW issue in Norway, this dimension has 
relevance in the context of the ATT process which the country actively supports. As it 
was pointed out by one of the NGO employees, the two successful disarmament 
processes resulting in the ban of landmines and cluster ammunition were both 
processes outside the UN, dominated by a network of willing states, while the future 
ATT intends to regulate arms trade in the framework of the UN
138
. The requirement of 
consensus in the UN was identified as a major obstacle by one of the government 
officials: “If you have the set-up you have in the room, what are you going to get 
consensus about? You‟re going to get consensus about we‟ve met, we‟ve 
discussed”139. The scepticism towards processes and decision-making based on 
consensus definitely signals a move in the direction of governance arrangements.  
 
However, both the selective character of networks and the lack of mechanisms 
compensating for inequalities and differences in power in new forms of decision-
making undoubtedly lead to arrangements that are less democratic. Indeed, as it is put 
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forward by Tvedt (2003:59), according to central actors, the success of the Norwegian 
model rests exactly on its undemocratic character. Few debates and the almost non-
existent democratic, parliamentary and public control of what the leadership of 
Norwegian development policy actually does are all necessary for the efficient 
functioning of the Norwegian model. Moreover, as former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Thorbjørn Jagland argued, the fact that there are only a handful of people included in 
policy making is a precondition for establishing trust among the actors.  
 
To sum up, both the issue-specific networks consisting of various actors and the 
preference for processes outside the consensus-based UN point to the existence of 
governance arrangements in the case of SALW issue in Norway. It should be noted, 
however, that according to one of the NGO employees, the openness of the 
government and the degree to which they include civil society in decision-making 
depends strongly on the subject and the implications it has
140
.  Furthermore, there are 
only a handful of examples of success or “breakthrough” by civil society resulting in a 
change of government policy, such as the use of NGO language in official documents 
or the publication of an ethical Code of Conduct by Nammo.  
 
Policy implementation 
The outsourcing of governmental tasks in Norway in the field of development aid and 
the provision of humanitarian relief already started in the 1980s, when the state to an 
increasing extent embarked on implementing its policies through “free-standing 
development diplomats on state salary”. From the 1990s, as the goals of foreign policy 
became more and more ambitious, contracting Norwegian NGOs for the 
implementation of different policies was an expressed strategy (Tvedt 2003:105).  
However, this trend has not only affected Norwegian development policy, but also 
security policy and more specifically the issue of SALW export. First of all, through 
the NORAD funding provided for the dissemination of information in the Norwegian 
society about central North-South and development issues, the state has successfully 
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outsourced the task of providing information about the SALW issue, which would 
require a significant amount of expertise, as well as resources. Even the NGO with a 
security focus included in the sample receives financial support on this basis, although 
the interviewee complained about the general difficulty of getting funding with this 
policy focus
141
. Thus, the Norwegian government in a way buys the service of 
disseminating information among the population from the civil society. A good 
example was given by one of the NGO employees, who told that they were asked by 
the government to make a “stunt” because the department wanted more awareness 
around an event
142
.  
 
There is a further aspect of the SALW issue that relates to the dimension of policy 
implementation, namely the nature of the international agreements. The majority of the 
agreements mentioned above that Norway subscribed to concerning the regulation of 
SALW export are not legally binding and are based on voluntary compliance. 
Nevertheless, these agreements have a strong normative power – as one of the NGO 
employees put it, “if you have a normative community or normative agreement, it 
actually translates into national export control regulations over time”143. Thus, if there 
is an established norm concerning the implementation of the export guidelines and 
criteria included in these agreements, the “beauty contest” among the states will lead 
to voluntary compliance.  
 
On the other hand, the aim with the future ATT is to have an international agreement 
that is legally binding. However, there are several reasons for limited optimism 
concerning the viability of such an agreement. First of all, as it was mentioned by one 
of the government officials, the process has already been delayed by one year, with the 
General Assembly agreeing on dedicating this year for the general exchange of 
views
144
. Thus, it will definitely take a few years until the ATT will be signed and 
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ratified by all UN members, if it will be accepted by the General Assembly and the 
Security Council. Furthermore, even if an international ATT will be in power in the 
future, experience has shown that the coercive power of the UN in case of non-
compliance is limited, and thus the treaty will still be based on self-enforcement.  
 
All in all, experience so far has shown that the most successful regional and 
international agreements regulating arms trade are based on self-enforced policies and 
voluntary compliance. This, together with the practice of policy implementation by 
private actors indicates the presence of security governance in this dimension.  
 
Table 6.1. sums up the findings about the potential existence of governance 
arrangements according to the different dimensions.  
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Table 6.1. Government vs. governance in the different dimension. 
Dimension  Centralisation 
vs. 
Fragmentation 
Geographical  International and regional SALW 
export agreements 
 Transnational nature of the 
Norwegian arms industry 
Fragmentation  
Functional  Division of labour between the 
government and the NGOs 
 Division of labour between the 
NGOs nationally and 
internationally 
Fragmentation 
Distribution of 
resources 
 State majority in the arms industry 
 Funding of NGOs dependent on the 
state 
Centralisation 
Interests  Conflicting state and NGO 
interests  
 Various interests within the NGO 
community 
Fragmentation 
Norms  Norway as a humanitarian 
superpower 
 The Norwegian model 
Fragmentation 
Decision-making  Networks consisting of various 
private and public actors 
 Preference for processes not based 
on consensus  
Fragmentation 
Policy implementation  The use of NGOs for the 
dissemination of information 
 Success of processes based on 
voluntary compliance 
Fragmentation 
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As it is demonstrated above, all dimensions except for the distribution of resources are 
characterised by fragmentation. Consequently, based on the empirical evidence 
provided by official documents and interviews with key informants, the arrangements 
in Norwegian security policy concerning the SALW issue can best be described by the 
concept of security governance.  
 
Regarding the typical problems associated with governance arrangements, such as 
governance failures identified by Krahmann (2005) as the mismatch between 
arrangements in the different dimensions, the inconsistencies around the Nammo 
Group could be mentioned as an example. The centralised decision by the government 
to pursue a more active state ownership in accordance with the principles of CSR is 
met by non-compliance as a result of fragmented policy implementation.  
 
In terms of the diffuse legitimacy and accountability relations discussed by Stoker 
(1998), none of the NGO employees interviewed has experienced blame avoidance or 
“scapegoating” by the government and the majority of them have not expressed fear of 
such actions in the future.  However, potential blame avoidance and legitimisation of 
government actions by the participation of civil society in the process were mentioned 
as the main reasons for their policy of standing outside national delegations by one of 
the NGO employees
145
.  
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6.1.2.   The Role of NGOs in Security Policy 
 
It is a central point in Krahmann‟s security governance theory that today‟s security 
policy is characterised by the growing influence of non-state actors both in decision-
making and policy implementation, leading to the fragmentation of authority 
(Krahmann 2005a). Therefore, it is important to assess whether Norwegian NGOs 
have indeed penetrated areas that are traditionally belong to the jurisdiction of security 
policy, such as disarmament processes.  
 
As it is demonstrated by the empirical findings in Chapter 5, in contrast to a general 
trend of securitisation in international politics (Buzan and Wæver 2003), the issue of 
SALW has been successfully desecuritised by NGOs. The reasons behind this move 
include pragmatic ones, like easier campaigning and access to governmental funding, 
as well as the significantly less problematic nature of discussing development 
problems compared to security policy
146
. Thus, the Norwegian NGOs generally avoid 
entering the terrorism approach and similar politically laden discussions, and preserve 
their humanitarian and development perspective even in the realm of security 
policy
147
.  
 
The two successful disarmament processes that built on the active inclusion of civil 
society in decision-making and policy implementation, namely the landmine and the 
cluster ammunition campaigns, were not traditional disarmament processes in the strict 
sense, as it was also emphasised by one of the government officials. These two 
campaigns that are often used as the classic examples of increasing NGO influence in 
security policy, framed the necessity of banning these arms as a question of 
humanitarian development, human rights and international humanitarian law, 
successfully moving disarmament from the narrow concept of security to the much 
broader concept of “human security”, thus legitimising NGO participation.  
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However, this reframing of the issue as a humanitarian and development question is 
not only characteristic of the NGO community. In the White Paper Nr.15. published by 
the MFA in March 2009, “humanitarian disarmament” is discussed as a perspective 
that has the humanitarian and developmental consequences of weapon use as a starting 
point, exemplified by the processes that led to the ban of landmines and cluster 
ammunitions. The new approach which is different from traditional arms control 
strengthens both international humanitarian law and human rights law, and gives a 
solid framework for efficient implementation of disarmament in the field (MFA 
2009b:112).  
Therefore, based on the findings of this case study, the impact of NGOs in traditional 
security policy questions is limited – their area of influence is restricted to the segment 
where traditional NGO competencies (humanitarian and development issues in the 
global South) and the extended concept of security meet, as it is illustrated by Figure 
6.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 6.1. The area of NGO influence in security policy 
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6.2.   Dilemmas, Strategies and Enabling Factors 
 
6.2.1. Dilemmas 
As it was presented above, the increased participation of civil society in foreign and 
security policy is clearly advantageous for the Norwegian government, since NGOs 
can provide the expertise and services that are necessary for efficient decision-making 
and policy implementation in an era when the concept of security has become so broad 
that it could easily result in the overload of central governments, besides increasing 
both the internal and the external legitimacy of these processes. However, there are 
some potential dangers associated with this close cooperation from the perspective of 
civil society that will be discussed in the following section, based on the literature 
presented in Chapter 2.  
The potential threat of adaptation mechanisms concerning the campaign topics as a 
result of dependence on funding from a single authority was discussed by Trenz in the 
context of German civil society and the EU (Trenz 2007). In the Norwegian case, the 
findings indicate that NGOs are highly dependent on financial support from NORAD, 
the MFA and other governmental sources, and thus the danger of adaptation 
mechanisms is relevant and needs to be assessed. According to the interviewees, the 
funding mechanisms of the government naturally result in a certain awareness of the 
topics that they prioritise, although they mostly have the possibility of either finding 
other sources for their activities
148
 or presenting the issue at hand in a way that it fits a 
certain type of funding
149
. Nevertheless, while the NGOs with a humanitarian or 
development focus can navigate quite freely among the different funding sources, 
organisations with a security policy focus are in a more difficult situation
150
. 
Furthermore, among the reasons for a desecuritisation of the SALW issue the 
interviewees mentioned that there are significantly more funds available in 
development than in security policy. Therefore, there are some trends visible that point 
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in the direction of adaptation mechanisms and the agenda-setting power of the 
government.  
 
Concerning the “watchdog vs. partner” dilemma, none of the NGOs included in the 
sample found it problematic to participate in consultations with the government. These 
consultations are regarded as valuable since they provide civil society the possibility of 
presenting their views and influencing the government‟s position. The rationale of 
civil society inclusion in the case of consultations is mostly based on epistemic claims 
from the government‟s side – NGOs function as advisors and provide the necessary 
information from the field to improve the quality of decision-making processes (see 
the presentation of V8 in Chapter 5). On the other hand, civil society would like to use 
the consultations to share their perspectives and knowledge
151
, as well as to change the 
government‟s position152.  
The meeting before the ATT conference is the perfect example of the manifestation of 
contrasting epistemic and accountability claims. As presented on p.73, both the 
government official and the NGO employee complained about the other not having a 
clear position about the issue, and both of them expected to form their position 
according to what the other would say. If we keep in mind the dilemma of 
accountability vs. epistemic claims, the reaction of the two interviewees becomes less 
surprising. The NGO employee who participates in the consultations originating from 
accountability claims needs to have the position of the government before forming the 
NGO opinion, because their watchdog role is built on post hoc evaluation. They use 
the consultations as a first hand source of information about government positions, so 
that they can form an opinion about this position as soon as possible and can mobilise 
the public if necessary. In contrast, the government official‟s view on the consultations 
is rooted in epistemic claims, and thus in using civil society for developing the official 
standpoint before it has crystallised itself. 
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The close cooperation between state and NGOs can also have negative implications 
concerning the independence of civil society. According to Karp (2006), the 
accreditation of NGO employees and researchers as members of national delegations 
at UN conferences is the manifestation of how close this cooperation is, and together 
with dependence on state funding it results in a “Faustian bargain”: in order to receive 
the necessary funding for their activities, NGOs avoid raising controversial issues and 
seize being a “watchdog”. Concerning the implications of state sponsorship, none of 
the Norwegian NGO employees included in the sample felt that they were “asked to 
keep quiet”153 or that they had to be careful about what topics they discuss.  
However, one of the interviewees mentioned that the governmental funding is 
basically for supporting Norwegian views on humanitarian issues
154
. It is difficult to 
assess whether NGO standpoints really have to be in accordance with governmental 
positions and to what extent it is considered it is decisive factor when granting funds, 
though there are some traces of evidence in the guidelines of the MFA and NORAD. 
The document says that the grant schemes “are primarily aimed at strengthening civil 
society as a driving force and agent for change in achieving national and international 
development goals” and are meant to enable for voluntary organisations to “contribute 
effectively to achieving key goals in Norwegian development policy” (MFA and 
NORAD 2001, emphasis added). These principles included in the guidelines imply 
that the government does have certain expectations concerning the harmonisation of 
state policies and civil society goals, which could be interpreted as a sign of civil 
society being co-opted. Furthermore, the example given by one of the NGO employees 
about the government ordering a “stunt” from them to raise awareness for an event 
organised by one of the state departments
155
 could signal an “unequal marriage” 
between the public and the private sphere. 
In terms of being a member of the Norwegian delegation at international conferences 
the NGO community is more divided. Two of the interviewees expressed fear that they 
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could be used to legitimise processes and standpoints
156
 or would have to support the 
Norwegian policies
157
, and therefore they rather distance themselves from these 
delegations.  However, both of them represent organisations that are part of an 
international umbrella organisation, and thus this policy of standing outside could 
originate from the international level. As it was mentioned by one of them, being a 
member of the Norwegian delegation sends “a signal to the rest of the world” where 
the roles of state and civil society are probably not so clear and are not respected by 
both parties
158
. Therefore, although they acknowledge that being a part of the 
Norwegian delegation would most likely not have any negative implications, as a local 
representative of international organisations they need to have clear policies.  
On the other hand, the majority of the interviewees have either already been a member 
of the national delegation or do not find it problematic at all. Since experience has 
shown that the Norwegian government respects the independence of civil society
159
, 
they choose the easiest way of getting accreditation.  
All in all, since neither governmental funding nor being a member of the national 
delegation is perceived as problematic by the majority of the Norwegian NGOs 
included in the sample, the “Faustian bargain” that according to Karp characterises the 
small arms campaign does not fit the Norwegian case, although the implications of the 
grant guidelines need further exploration. Also, by prioritising NGOs with a 
development or environmental focus, the government does have a certain agenda-
setting role through the funding mechanisms. 
 
In terms of the consequences of participation for deliberative democracy, the dilemma 
between being a valuable member of the negotiations or an advocate of their 
organisations is avoided by the consultant role that Norwegian NGOs play in 
consultations. The fact that they rather provide background information for the 
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decisions taken by the government than actively formulating and choosing certain 
policies can be explained by the dilemma inherent in deliberation. Although their 
actual recommendations are often included in the governmental position and in 
policies, by restraining to providing information they do not have to adjust their views 
to reach consensus and can preserve their agenda. Since none of the interviewees 
included in the sample knew of other NGOs that wished to be invited to consultations 
but were not granted access, the potentially elitist and exclusive nature of civil society 
participation discussed by Hendriks (2006) does not apply to the Norwegian case. 
However, this is probably the result of the Norwegian community being very small.  
6.2.2.   Strategies 
 
The strategies and tactics identified by Keck and Sikkink also characterise the 
Norwegian civil society. In terms of information politics, the crucial role of civil 
society in providing information from the ground and including the field perspective 
was stressed by both government officials and NGO employees. Symbolic politics is 
used as a tool in the campaigns, for instance “big posters of crying children”160 or 
lying in the street covered up in blood with a poster saying “the weapon that killed me 
was made in Norway”(PRESS 2009). Concerning leverage politics, NGOs often 
appeal on the reputation of Norway as a peace promoter and contrast it to the role the 
country plays in arms trade. As it was pointed out by one of the NGO employees, 
Norway actively pursues the aim of being a humanitarian superpower and a peace 
negotiator, and thus if someone criticises some aspects of it and it is discussed in the 
media, the topic will attract considerable attention and create widespread debate
161
. 
Finally, accountability politics was used in the case mentioned by one of the 
interviewees when they demanded that Nammo publish an ethical Code of Conduct 
based on the White Paper issued by the government on CSR. Then, when they had the 
Code of Conduct in writing, they could confront politicians with the practices of the 
state-owned company and require a change in these practices.  
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6.2.3.   Enabling Factors 
 
From the factors that contributed to the good functioning of the Norwegian model in 
security policy and in general, the interviewees mentioned the following: 
 Clear roles that are respected by both parties 
 Positive experience 
 Trust (that is built on experience) 
 Strong legitimacy of the NGO leadership 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to explore whether the special form of cooperation between 
the Norwegian state and civil society in the field of security policy, and more 
specifically the SALW issue, is an instance of what Elke Krahmann terms “security 
governance”. Furthermore, my intention was to identify potentially unique factors and 
circumstances that contribute to the efficient functioning of the Norwegian model in 
this case, that could be the basis of future studies on the applicability of this 
Norwegian trademark in other settings, such as the EU.  
Concerning the existence of governance arrangements in Norwegian security policy, 
my analysis of documentary evidence and interview data according to the seven 
dimensions presented by Krahmann (2005a:12) found that except for the distribution 
of resources, all dimensions were characterised by fragmentation instead of 
centralisation. Thus, the structures and processes evolving around the Norwegian 
SALW policy can best be described by the concept of security governance. 
In terms of the enabling factors of successful state-NGO cooperation and the dilemmas 
that arise from this unique relationship, Karp (2006) argued that as a result of “the 
unequal marriage” between civil society and governments, the latter was co-opted in 
the small arms campaign. According to him, this “Faustian bargain” manifests itself in 
NGO dependence on state sponsorship and accreditation as members of national 
delegations at international conferences, and consequently the loss of their 
independent and critical voice.  
When it comes to the resources available for Norwegian NGOs, except for the two 
NGOs included in the sample that have a policy of not accepting state support at all, 
the majority of them are heavily dependent on governmental funding, often amounting 
to 100% of their total budget. Although none of the NGO employees interviewed 
expressed a perceived agenda-control by the government, the grant guidelines of 
NORAD and the MFA requiring the harmonisation of NGO standpoints with 
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Norwegian foreign policy aims, as well as the prioritisation of NGOs with a 
development and humanitarian focus above those with a security policy approach 
indicate that adaptation mechanisms are to some extent present in the Norwegian case. 
However, preserving a self-standing civil society is in the interest of the state, as well, 
because it is necessary if the inclusive approach has the aim of giving legitimacy to 
decision-making and policy implementation processes.  
Similarly to funding, the NGO employees were divided on their attitudes towards 
being a member of the Norwegian delegation at international conferences, with two 
organisations clearly restraining from this way of accreditation, while the rest 
perceiving it as unproblematic. Concerning participation in consultations with the 
government, all interviewees, both from the government and the NGO side assign a 
high value to these arenas, and depict the relationship as mutually beneficial. 
However, there are signs of collision between epistemic and accountability claims that 
could potentially cause some problems and conflicts in the future. Furthermore, the 
extensive use of NGOs for policy implementation by the government can also be 
dangerous in the long-term, and lead to the concerns discussed by Karp, namely that 
the official agenda becomes the NGO agenda. On the other hand, the NGO community 
in Norway is raising awareness about issues that are controversial and abundant with 
central security and industrial interests. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a “Faustian 
bargain” has taken place between the Norwegian NGOs and the state and that they are 
co-opted in the SALW issue. 
Based on the interview data, I attempted to identify recurring factors that were 
mentioned by NGO employees as prerequisites of the successful functioning of the 
Norwegian model. I found that both in the context of consultations and membership in 
national delegations the interviewees stressed the importance of clear roles respected 
by both parties, positive experiences with the Norwegian government, trust (built on 
the positive experience) and strong NGO leadership with clear mandates.  
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A further important finding was made that relates both to the concept of security 
governance and the enabling factors of efficient cooperation. The comparison of the 
disarmament processes in the last two decades and the reasons given by the 
interviewees for discussing the SALW issue in a humanitarian and human rights 
framework revealed a desecuritisation trend in these processes. The NGOs preserved 
their original mandates and focus areas, and their increased activity in the field of 
security policy did not result from the expansion of their competencies, but from the 
broadening of the security concept to include political, economic, social and 
environmental threats under the umbrella of “human security”. Although it is not 
possible to generalise from a single case study, the findings suggest that the area of 
NGO influence in security policy is restricted to the segment where traditional NGO 
competencies and the extended concept of security meet. Still, further research is 
necessary to explore whether this common segment of competencies indeed opens a 
path for an inclusive and cosmopolitan security policy replacing the traditional closed-
room approach.  
The question of whether the Norwegian model could be applied in other settings, 
especially at the European level and in the CFSP is particularly important in the light 
of recent attempts to include civil society in policy formulation and implementation as 
a remedy for the democratic deficit and the legitimacy crisis in the EU. The majority 
of the interviewees stressed that whether a close cooperation with the government is 
problematic is strongly dependent on the national settings. The respect of clear roles 
and NGO independence by the Norwegian government, as well as the trust resulting 
from years of positive experience are decisive factors concerning the participation in 
consultations or national delegations. As one of the interviewees pointed out, when an 
NGO receives accreditation as a member of the national delegation, it sends a signal to 
the rest of the world
162
, while in other national settings this close cooperation could be 
extremely problematic and could indeed lead to a “Faustian bargain”. The awareness 
of these two Norwegian NGOs about not sending such a signal to other NGOs around 
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the world could imply that being a member of national delegations is not accepted by 
the whole of the international NGO community.  
On the other hand, another interviewee has experienced that NGOs from other 
countries are often “jealous” of their Norwegian counterparts for having such a 
privileged relationship with the state
163
, indicating a demand from the NGO side for 
arrangements similar to the Norwegian model. This demand is also there from the side 
of the EU, as it is demonstrated by the White Paper on Governance calling for open 
methods of consultation and attributing a more important role for organised civil 
society in the forming and implementation of European policies (Commission 2001). 
In the following, I will assess the possibility of “exporting” the Norwegian model to 
the EU, based on the enabling factors identified by the interviewees and on the 
dilemmas presented in the literature on state-civil society cooperation. However, it is 
important to note that this is solely a discussion and I will by no means attempt to 
generalise the findings of this case study to the Norwegian model as a whole or to 
public-private cooperation in the field of society. Still, I think that the theoretical 
evaluation of whether the Norwegian model has relevance and is viable for the EU can 
serve as the basis of future research on the topic.  
There are significant differences between the Norwegian and the European settings 
that could hinder successful and efficient civil society-EU cooperation. First of all, the 
frequent lack of consensus concerning the CFSP could discourage NGOs from 
involvement in decision-making and policy implementation – if the common position 
of the EU has to stick to the lowest standard that the member states could agree on, 
then there is no point in participating in consultations at the European level, and it is 
more efficient to lobby the national governments so that each member state moves 
towards a more radical position as a result of NGO influence.  
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Also, the EU is often seen as the block of rich Western states
164
 by the global South, 
and together with the colonial past of many European countries, this could lead to EU 
efforts in the field of CFSP, and especially the promotion of certain norms, perceived 
of as cultural imperialism (Sjursen 2007). Understandably, we could expect that the 
majority of the NGOs would not like to be associated with this reputation, especially 
in the light of the findings of this case study which indicate a strong identification of 
civil society with Norway‟s international legitimacy and reputation  
Furthermore, while the participation of NGOs in consultations could work well in a 
small country like Norway, exporting the Norwegian model to the European level 
would necessarily lead to the representation of civil society instead of the inclusion of 
all relevant actors. “Civil society” as it is used by the European institutions became 
synonymous with organised civil society, promoting rather the representation of civil 
society by the “chosen” associations (mostly EU-level organisations with sufficient 
resources to have permanent offices in Brussels) than direct participation (Kohler-
Koch 2009). In addition, there are selection mechanisms and barriers within the civil 
society organisations themselves. As it is demonstrated by a study of Central- and 
Eastern European interest groups in the EU, the representation of European civil 
society in Brussels hardly mirrors the civil society in different member states. As a 
result of the constraints posed by limited financial resources and the high level of 
professionalisation that is required for successful lobbying at the European level, the 
new member states are underrepresented among Brussels-based interest groups 
(Charrad 2008). However, this problematique is not limited to the new member states 
– even German civil society organisations have difficulties representing their interests 
in Brussels,  resulting from lack of resources and expertise, such as language skills and 
in-depth knowledge of the functioning of European institutions (Trenz 2007). Thus, a 
move from participation to representation without proper mechanisms for the selection 
of representatives could lead to potentially elitist and exclusive arrangements 
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(Hendriks 2006) – or in other words, the inclusion of civil society in decision-making 
as the cure for democratic deficit would result in undemocratic structures.  
Furthermore, the strong legitimacy of the NGO leadership was identified by one of the 
interviewees as a major factor that enables the functioning of the Norwegian model, 
because it guarantees that the NGOs do not get into a soft relationship with actors that 
they should not. On the other hand, a representative structure with suspicion and 
alienation on part of the local groups towards the leadership at the European level 
would lack this assurance, and as a result, many NGOs would probably choose to 
refrain from participation.  
Finally, interviewees from both the governmental and the NGO side mentioned that 
international politics would benefit from more unusual constellations of states and 
cross-regional cooperation, and thus NGOs would potentially prefer lobbyism at the 
national level over cooperation at the European level, because it gives them more 
flexibility to create alliances in countries outside the traditional blocks.  
Still, many NGO employees emphasised the importance of the EU and the efficiency 
of the EU CoC as a regional arms control agreement. It managed to establish a strong 
norm in the field, and resulted in increased awareness and transparency in many 
member states, as well as countries outside the EU. In addition, it gave momentum to 
the ATT process by providing a document that has gone far in implementing human 
rights and humanitarian law that the ATT can build on
165
. Finally, the interviewees 
pointed out that the EU is an exceptionally powerful actor in global politics, and 
experience has shown that getting an international agreement without the EU on board 
is almost impossible
166
.  
As mentioned above, the findings indicate that increased NGO influence in security 
policy could be a result of the extended concept of “human security”, incorporating 
issues traditionally belonging to the competencies of humanitarian and development 
organisations. Over the years, the EU has been a significant actor in development aid 
                                                          
165
 Interview 2 with an NGO employee, 24.03.2009. 
166
 Interview 7 with an NGO employee, 30.03.2009. 
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and humanitarian assistance and has an expressed goal of becoming an efficient peace-
builder and a “force for good” in the world (Aggestam 2008). Furthermore, it has 
recently embarked on pursuing a human security agenda and commissioned the 
“Barcelona Report on A human security doctrine for Europe” which suggests a human 
security base for the CFSP and the establishment of a Human Security Response Force 
(The Barcelona Report 2004). According to Matlary (2008), “(t)he EU, not being a 
state, has the advantage of being able to adopt human security as its only paradigm”, 
and can avoid the traditional notion of state security. Therefore, since the EU focuses 
on the broad security concept instead of the traditional narrow definition evolving 
around military force and the protection citizens within a state‟s territory, cooperation 
with civil society in decision-making and policy implementation in the CFSP could 
potentially result in more extensive NGO impact than in the case of nation states 
where the core security competencies remain outside the mandate and influence of 
NGOs. Moreover, in order to pursue the “ethical power Europe” and becoming a 
normative superpower, legitimacy provided by civil society participation comes as a 
necessity.  
 
All in all, the potential for the successful export of the Norwegian model to the EU is 
there, though there are some deficiencies presented above that need to be addressed so 
that the inclusion of civil society in decision-making and policy implementation can 
increase efficiency and function as the remedy for the democratic deficit and 
legitimacy crisis of the EU. Since the trust based on positive experiences and the 
respect of clear roles still needs to be established, the path leading to more inclusive, 
legitimate and efficient decision-making will almost certainly be filled with conflicts 
and difficulties.  
Based on the Norwegian SALW export regime, this study has shown that governance 
arrangements are indeed present in security policy and that the well-functioning 
Norwegian model is not restricted to the area of humanitarian and development policy. 
With the growing popularity of governance and the proliferation of NGOs in the post-
Cold War era, this unique symbiosis needs increased attention in international politics.  
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Annex I – Interview Guide (Government Official version) 
 
Activities 
 Could you tell me a few words about your responsibilities at the Department? 
 What does the cooperation with other departments involve? 
Security policy vs. human rights 
 Traditionally, arms export is seen as a matter of security policy and strategic 
interests. When did the human rights and development aspect enter the 
discussion? 
 What are the reasons for that? 
 How did it affect your activities? Do you feel like responsibilities were taken 
away from you? 
 Is the export of small arms treated differently than nuclear weapons and 
WMDs? 
 Do you see any problems with the use of the human rights framework? 
 The Wassenaar Agreement focuses on the link between SALW and terrorism. 
Do you think that the goals originating from a security perspective are 
compatible with those originating from a human rights perspective? Trying to 
address the same problems? 
 What were the reasons behind the inclusion of human rights considerations in 
the arms export guidelines in 2007? (Stortingsvedtak 1997) 
Relationship with the NGOs 
 Do you cooperate with NGOs on the SALW export issue? (consultations) Or 
they rather try to lobby the (other) department ?  
 Who took the initiative?  
 Do you think that they make valuable contributions or they rather make your 
life more difficult?  
 Do you think that their goals and recommendations are reasonable?  
 Did you change some policies or positions as a result of NGO lobbying? 
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International setting 
 Norwegian regulations concerning arms export were already quite strict before 
the EU CoC. Did the CoC have any significant impact on Norwegian practices? 
 In your opinion, is it an advantage or a disadvantage that Norway is not a 
member of the EU?  
 Do you think that Norway can have a more radical position and stricter 
regulations than the EU? 
 Do you think that Norway is perceived as being more legitimate when 
presenting a position on arms export, thanks to its activities as a peace 
promoter? 
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Annex II – Interview Guide (NGO version) 
 
Activities 
 
 Could you tell me a few words about your organisation and your role? 
 When did you engage in the small arms issue? 
 
Human rights approach 
 Did you present and discuss small arms exports from the beginning as a 
question of human rights, or did you change the context at some point? 
 Why not as related to terrorism and transnational organised crime? Would have 
been easier to get the attention of governments? 
 What are the advantages and disadvantages of using the human rights 
framework? 
 
 Do you think that the NGO community can build on the success of the landmine 
and cluster ammunition campaigns, or are the cases too different to be 
compared? 
Goals 
 What are your main goals concerning SALW export?  
 Would you like to limit gun ownership or is the topic too problematic? 
(Domestic interests of the states) 
 How/why did the goals change over time (if they did)? 
 In your opinion, what are the main problems and deficiencies of the current 
SALW export regulations? 
 Could you name some problems that are specifically associated with Norwegian 
practices?  
 What is your opinion about Norway as the peace promoter and the arms 
exporter? 
Funding 
 Do you receive funds from the government? 
 Is your funding based on projects and campaigns, or is it continuous? 
 Do you think that government funds (would) endanger your independence? 
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Relationship with the state 
 
Openness: 
 How often are you invited to consultations with the government? (on a regular 
basis?) What are the occasions?  
 Who took the initiative? Did you have to push for being included in decision-
making and policy formulation?  
 
Responsiveness: 
 Do you feel that your recommendations are generally taken into consideration 
by government officials? 
o Could you tell me some specific examples for both cases? 
 
Consensual or conflictive? 
 On which topics did you / do you disagree with the government? 
Norwegian strategic interests? 
 Do you think that your independent status is weakened by participating in 
consultations or you rather see it as a good opportunity to make impact? 
 
Strategies 
 Besides the consultations, how do you try to influence the government‟s 
position? 
 Personal contacts at the ministries? Journalists? 
 At which phases do you use which strategies? 
 
Relationship with other NGOs 
 Are there any NGOs that work on small arms exports but are not included in 
consultations? 
 
IF YES:  
Exclusive/inclusive: 
 How is your relationship with NGOs that are not invited to consultations? 
 Do you consider them marginal to the campaign? 
 Do you provide information for them? 
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IF NO: 
Conflicts: 
 Do you coordinate with  other NGOs before consultations with the 
government? 
 Do you try to formulate a common position before the meetings? 
 Is it difficult to reach consensus? 
 
International Setting 
 How would you assess the role of the EU in the small arms initiative? 
 Do you try to influence decision-making concerning amendments to / 
improvement of the current SALW regulations at the international or rather at 
the national level? 
 How does the non-membership of Norway in the EU affect your activities? 
 Do you think that Norway can present a more radical position at UN 
conferences because it‟s not a member of the EU? 
 Would you say that Norway is perceived as more legitimate thanks to its efforts 
as a peace promoter?  
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Annex III – Checklist for the Interviews 
 
D1 – FUNDING 
Origins    
 State  
 Private  
 EU  
Basis   
 Campaigns/projects  
 Continous  
 
D1 – STRATEGIES 
Consultations  
Journalists  
Personal contacts at the 
ministries 
 
International activities, 
networks 
 
 
 
D2 – THE ISSUE OF SALW EXPORT 
Framing as a human rights issue from 
the beginning? 
 
Change in the framework?  
Advantages and disadvantages  
Problems with the current regulation  
  
Landmine and cluster ammunition 
campaigns 
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D3 – The SALW Issue in Norway 
 
Problems with Norwegian SALW export 
regulations/practices 
 
NGO Goals vs. Norwegian strategic interests  
 
 
 
D4 – RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE 
 
Openness   
 Frequency  
 Occasion  
 Initiative  
 Transparency  
Responsiveness   
 Initial position  
 Impact of the NGOs, 
success? 
 
 Norwegian interests vs. 
NGO goals 
 
Independence    
 Watchdog or partner?  
 NGOs as 
experts/consultants 
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D4 – RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER NGOS 
 
All 
invited? 
  
NOT 
invited 
  
 Marginal?  
 Transmission belts  
ARE 
invited 
  
 Coordination before the 
meetings 
 
 Common position  
 Difficult to achieve?  
 
D5 – INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
Norway‟s international reputation, 
legitimacy 
 
Norway as the peace promoter and arms 
exporter 
 
The EU‟s reputation, legitimacy   
Role of the EU in the small arms initiative  
Norwegian non-membership in the EU (+/-)  
Experiences from the ATT process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
 
Annex IV – Variables and Coding Template 
 
D1 
V1 – Funding, general functioning, strategies  
V2 – Links to international advocacy networks 
 
D2 
V3 – The human rights, humanitarian and development approach vs. the security 
approach 
V4 – General problems with SALW export regulation 
V5 – Differences from and similarities with the landmine and cluster ammunition 
campaigns 
 
D3 
V6 – Problems with Norwegian SALW export regulations/practices 
V7 – NGO interests/goals vs. Norwegian strategic interests 
 
D4 
V8 – NGOs as experts and consultants 
V9 – Consultations/participation vs. Independence (Watchdog or partner?) 
V10 – Examples of success 
V11 – Common position before consultations 
 
D5 
V12 – Norway‟s international reputation and legitimacy 
V13 – The EU‟s role, reputation and legitimacy 
V14 – Advantages and disadvantages of Norwegian non-membership in the EU 
 
